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Vertical Power
Michael S. Green*
Many legal scholars and federal judges — including Justices Ginsburg
and Scalia — have implicitly assumed that a state can extend its procedural
law solely to federal courts within its borders. To date, however, no one has
identified this assumption, much less defended it. Drawing upon an example
discussed by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 1 (1825), I argue that such vertical power does not exist. Not only
do states lack a legitimate interest in extending their law vertically, a state’s
assertion of vertical power would improperly discriminate against federal
courts. If state law applies beyond the state court system, it must do so on
the basis of a criterion that can be satisfied by sister state as well as federal
courts. This requirement, which I call the principle of coordinancy, has
important consequences, not merely for Erie cases, but for any situation in
which the federal government seeks to identify legitimate state interests in
the activities of federal courts.
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INTRODUCTION
The question is simple — so simple that it is remarkable that it has
received no academic treatment. Can a state legitimately extend its law
to the procedure of federal courts within its borders? Consider title 12,
section 1101.1(B)(3) of the Oklahoma Statutes, which requires a losing
plaintiff in a contract action who previously refused an offer of
settlement to pay the defendant’s attorney’s fees.1 Can Oklahoma
officials extend section 1101.1(B)(3) to contract actions filed in federal
court in Oklahoma?
Almost 200 years ago, Chief Justice Marshall gave a negative answer
in Wayman v. Southard. That states lack such power over federal
procedure, he argued, is “one of those political axioms, an attempt to
demonstrate which, would be a waste of argument not to be excused.”2
Marshall asks us to imagine a state law that has the “direct and sole
purpose of regulating proceedings in the courts of the Union.”3 An
example would be an Oklahoma statute like section 1101.1(B)(3),
except purporting to apply, not to Oklahoma state courts, but to federal
courts within the state. “No gentleman,” he claimed, “will be so
extravagant as to maintain the efficacy of such an act.”4 But, he
continued, “[i]t seems not much less extravagant to maintain that the
practice of the federal courts and the conduct of their officers can be
indirectly regulated by the state legislatures by an act professing to
regulate the proceedings of the state courts.”5 Oklahoma officials cannot
start with section 1101.1(B)(3), which applies to Oklahoma state
courts, and extend it to federal courts in the state. “It is a general rule,”
he argued, “that what cannot be done directly from defect of power
cannot be done indirectly.”6
I think Marshall was right. States lack vertical power over federal
procedure: they cannot extend their procedural law solely to federal
courts (in particular, federal courts within their borders). But the
conclusion is hardly so obvious that it needs no defense. As we shall
see, many federal courts and legal scholars assume states have the very
vertical power Marshall rejected.7 For example, in her dissent in Shady

1 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1101.1(B)(3) (2014); see Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Tolliver, 636
F.3d 1273, 1278 (10th Cir. 2011).
2 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 49 (1825).
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 49-50.
6 Id. at 50.
7 See infra Part II.
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Grove Orthopedic Associates, Justice Ginsburg suggested that section
901(b) of the New York Civil Practice Law, which prohibits claims for
statutory damages from being brought as class actions, might have been
intended by New York officials to apply not merely to New York state
courts but also to, and only to, federal courts in the state.8 Although
Justices Scalia and Stevens disagreed with her interpretation of New
York law,9 they expressed no skepticism about her interpretation of
New York power. Nor is the matter as simple as embracing Marshall’s
opinion in Wayman, for in the end he does not merely claim that states
lack vertical power over federal procedure — he mistakenly concludes
they have no power over federal procedure at all.
In this Article, I will defend the principle that states lack vertical
power over federal procedure. For reasons that will become clear later,
I will call this the “principle of coordinancy.” I begin by defining the
principle’s scope.10 Unlike Marshall, I do not claim that states have no
power over federal procedure. For example, Oklahoma officials are free
to bind section 1101.1(B)(3) up into Oklahoma contract actions,
thereby extending the rule to all courts — federal and sister state — that
entertain such actions.11 What I deny is that they have the power to
extend their law to federal courts alone, and particularly to federal
courts within the state’s borders.
Two other clarifications are important to appreciate the principle of
coordinancy’s scope. First, it denies that states have an original vertical
power over federal procedure.12 It does not deny that they can be
delegated such a power by federal law. Second, the principle denies that
states have any original vertical power over federal procedure.13 They
lack such power even in the absence of competing federal law.14
After clarifying the principle’s scope, I then show its importance by
describing how often federal courts and legal scholars have implicitly
rejected it.15 Because this Article is the first to identify the question of
vertical power, it is easy to think that the question is marginal or
insignificant. To show its importance, I describe a large number of cases
8 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 453-58
(2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see infra Part II.B.1.
9 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 431-36 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment); id. at 398-406 (majority opinion).
10 Infra Part I.
11 See infra Part I.A.3.
12 See infra Part I.B.
13 See infra Part I.C.
14 Id.
15 Infra Part II.
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in which the assumption that states have vertical power plays a crucial
role. (A reader who agrees with me about the question’s importance
could safely skip this part.)
I next offer my defense of the principle of coordinancy.16 In
particular, I argue that states lack a legitimate interest in extending their
law vertically and that any assertion of vertical power would improperly
discriminate against federal courts. I end by describing the important
consequences the principle has, not merely for Erie cases, but for any
situation in which the federal government seeks to identify legitimate
state interests in the activities of federal courts.17
I.

THE PRINCIPLE

The principle I will defend in this Article is that states lack vertical
power over federal procedure.18 In this Part, I will spend some time
clarifying the principle’s scope.
16

Infra Part III.
Infra Conclusion.
18 Any law review article seeking to identify the scope of procedure usually begins
with two warnings. The first is that the distinction between substance and procedure
can vary given the context within which it occurs. Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance”
and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 337 (1933); Thomas O. Main,
The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 801, 815 (2010); see
also Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945). The second is that the distinction
is difficult or impossible to draw. Kurt M. Saunders, Playing the Erie Waters: Choice of
Law in the Deterrence of Frivolous Appeals, 21 GA. L. REV. 653, 692 (1987) (describing
concepts of substance and procedure as “amorphous” at best); Edwin W. Stockmeyer,
Note, Challenging the Plausibility Standard Under the Rules Enabling Act, 97 MINN. L.
REV. 2379, 2399 (2013); see also Joseph P. Bauer, Shedding Light on Shady Grove:
Further Reflections on the Erie Doctrine from a Conflicts Perspective, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 939, 948 (2011) (“[T]he boundary between substance and procedure is both
imprecise and varying depending on the context in which the question is posed.”).
These difficulties are generally tied to the problem of identifying laws as substantive or
procedural, where the designation has certain important consequences, particularly for
choice of law. But it is not my goal to distinguish between laws that are substantive or
procedural. By speaking of federal “procedure,” I simply seek to identify an area of
regulatory concern and to ask about the scope of states’ lawmaking power in that area.
As I will use the term here, “federal procedure” is the activity of people — judges,
parties, lawyers, witnesses, and the like — in connection with actions that are filed in
federal court. It includes the usual activities covered in a first-year course on civil
procedure: filing, service, pleading, dismissals (for jurisdiction, failure to state a claim,
lack of timeliness, and failure to satisfy a condition for suit), joinder, certification of
class actions, disclosure and discovery, summary judgment, the presentation of
evidence at trial, appeal, and the enforcement of judgments. My question is the extent
to which all these activities can be regulated by the states — in particular, whether a
state can regulate such activity vertically, by extending its law only to federal courts
within its borders.
17
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A. Vertical v. Coordinate Power
The principle I will defend is inspired by the example that Marshall
offered in Wayman, in which a state attempted to regulate federal
procedure vertically. But if one looks to the entirety of Marshall’s
opinion in Wayman, one finds him expressing a much stronger position.
States do not merely lack vertical power over federal procedure; they
lack any power over federal procedure.19 In adopting this position,
Marshall was in keeping with the prevailing view at the time, and well
after, under which a sovereign — federal, state, or foreign — has
exclusive authority over the procedure of its own courts, even when
they entertain actions under another sovereign’s law.20
I will begin by spelling out Marshall’s position that federal power over
federal procedure is exclusive.21 I will then describe how federal courts
eventually abandoned this position in favor of the view that the federal
government and the states have concurrent power over federal
procedure.22 Finally, I will distinguish states’ concurrent power over
federal procedure from the vertical power at issue in this Article.23
1.

Exclusive Power

Wayman concerned a Kentucky statute governing the execution of
judgments.24 The statute required the judgment creditor to accept in

Although my focus will be on federal procedure, not the distinction between
substantive and procedural laws, I will occasionally describe a jurisdiction’s law as
“procedural,” meaning that the law is intended by those who created it to apply in the
jurisdiction’s courts regardless of the cause of action under which the plaintiff sues. See
infra Part III.C. Thus New York’s statute of limitations for tort would be “procedural”
in this sense if it applies to all tort actions brought in New York state courts, including
those under the law of sister states.
19 See infra Part I.A.1; see also Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA.
L. REV. 813, 838-39 (2008); Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court
Procedures, 110 YALE L.J. 947, 977 n.167 (2001).
20 Dixon’s Ex’rs v. Ramsay’s Ex’rs, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 319, 324 (1806) (“No man can
sue in the courts of any country, whatever his rights may be, unless in conformity with
the rules prescribed by the laws of that country.”); see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 556 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1834) (“It is universally
admitted and established, that the forms of remedies, and the modes of proceeding, and
the execution of judgments, are to be regulated solely and exclusively by the laws of the
place, where the action is instituted . . . .”); Bellia, supra note 19, at 976-83. But see infra
Part II.C.
21 See infra Part I.A.1.
22 See infra Part I.A.2.
23 See infra Part I.A.3.
24 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 50 (1825).
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payment notes of the Bank of Kentucky or of the Bank of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky (both of which were considerably
devalued) or a replevin bond for the debt, payable in two years.25 In
Lapsley v. Brashears, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky had struck down
the statute as an impairment of contracts, in violation of the United
States and Kentucky Constitutions.26 But demand for relief for debtors
in the wake of the Panic of 1819 was so great that an alternative highest
court of appeals was created by the state legislature.27 Because the “Old
Court” refused to recognize the validity of the “New Court,” at the time
that Wayman was decided, there were two highest courts of appeals in
Kentucky with different views about the statute’s constitutionality.28
Sidestepping the Contract Clause issue, Marshall concluded that the
statute did not apply to a federal court’s execution of a federal
judgment.29 As he framed the question, the Court’s choice was between
two possibilities: exclusive state or exclusive federal regulatory
authority. If the plaintiff was correct, federal law “must govern the
officer in all his proceedings upon executions [of federal judgments].”30
If the defendants were correct, “the state legislatures retain complete
authority over [the execution of such judgments].”31 Marshall did not
appear to consider the possibility of concurrent authority, such as a
system in which state law governs of its own force unless preempted by
federal law.
Marshall’s position was probably influenced by the prevailing
conception of the lawmaking power of territorially-defined sovereigns
as exclusive within their borders. As he put it in Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon: “The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is
necessarily exclusive and absolute.”32 Only the sovereign has legislative
authority over activities that occur within its borders, including the
activities of its own courts.
25 1 C.S. MOREHEAD & MASON BROWN, An Act to Regulate Endorsements on Executions:
Approved December 25, 1820, in A DIGEST OF THE STATUTE LAWS OF KENTUCKY 629, 62930 (1834).
26 Lapsley v. Brashears, 14 Ky. (4 Litt.) 47, 56-57 (1823).
27 John C. Doolan, The Old Court-New Court Controversy, 11 GREEN BAG 177, 18082 (1899).
28 Kristin A. Collins, “A Considerable Surgical Operation”: Article III, Equity, and
Judge-Made Law in the Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 249, 301-03 (2010).
29 Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 50.
30 Technically, Marshall spoke of this option as the common law, as modified by
federal law, governing federal procedure. Id. at 21. But the fact remains that he rejected
the possibility of concurrent state and federal regulatory authority.
31 Id.
32 Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
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In keeping with this theory, only one sovereign had legislative
authority even over transactions that straddled borders. Under the
common law of choice of law recognized by state and federal courts in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, regulatory authority over
such transactions rested exclusively in the sovereign within whose
territory a particular triggering event took place. For example, under
the principle of lex loci delicti, the sovereign in whose territory the harm
occurred had the exclusive power to determine the legal status of a
potentially tortious act, even when the act causing the harm occurred
outside the sovereign’s borders.33 Insofar as Marshall, like others at the
time, adopted this choice-of-law approach,34 he too saw the division of
lawmaking power between sovereigns — including the states — as
exclusive.
This theory of exclusive authority extended even to adjudicative
authority over a defendant. Under the traditional view of personal
jurisdiction (read into the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
in Pennoyer v. Neff35), only the sovereign where a person was then
located had the power to initiate in personam adjudicative authority
over her.36 To be sure, having acquired personal jurisdiction by proper
service of process on the defendant within its borders, the sovereign
retained the power to enter a binding judgment against her even when
she was no longer present.37 Thus, a person served in two states in
connection with two lawsuits would find herself subject to overlapping
adjudicative authority. But the power to initiate adjudicative authority
at a particular time was possessed by one sovereign alone. Even the
sovereign where the defendant was domiciled was unable to initiate
such authority if she was outside its borders.38
33 Alabama G.S.R. Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803, 805-07 (Ala. 1892) (applying
Mississippi law to determine applicability of fellow-servant rule to wrongdoing of
corporation’s employee in Alabama because harm from wrongdoing occurred in
Mississippi); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934).
34 Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 890 (1824).
35 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
36 Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 612 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828). For a discussion of
the history of tag jurisdiction, see Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610-15
(1990).
37 See, e.g., Potter v. Allin, 2 Root 63, 67 (Conn. 1793) (noting that jurisdiction over
foreigners is possible “where their persons or properties had been attached and
holden”); Barrell v. Benjamin, 15 Mass. (15 Tyng) 354, 357-58 (1819) (noting
jurisdiction over foreigner is possible on the basis of transient presence in the state).
38 Domicile without in-state service was not recognized in the common law as a
method of in personam jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 29
cmt. c (1971). It was ultimately upheld as a source of in personam jurisdiction in
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1940).
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Unlike a territorially defined sovereign, however, the federal
government was assigned legislative authority by subject matter. Thus,
the question of whether its authority was exclusive or concurrent with
the states was more difficult.39 But even here, Marshall was attracted to
exclusivity. For example, in Gibbons v. Ogden, he saw “great force” in
the argument that Congress had exclusive lawmaking power over
interstate commerce.40 Thus, we should not be surprised that he
thought the federal government had exclusive lawmaking authority
over the procedure of federal courts. Just as he saw interstate commerce
as subject to exclusive federal authority, even when the specific act of
interstate commerce that was regulated occurred within a state’s
borders, he also saw the procedure of federal courts as subject to
exclusive federal regulatory authority, even when the federal court was
located within a state.
2.

Concurrent Power

But over time, exclusivity of authority was abandoned in each of the
areas I have described above. Concerning Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause, federal courts acknowledged concurrent federal and
state authority very early. In Cooley v. Board of Wardens, the Supreme
Court concluded that the Commerce Clause prohibited only state law
that governed a national matter or burdened interstate commerce
directly.41 In other areas, state regulation of interstate commerce was
permissible, unless preempted by federal law.42 With the Supreme
Court’s expansion of the scope of federal power under the Commerce
Clause during the New Deal, the area where the states and the federal
government share regulatory authority over commerce has expanded

39 See generally ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
FEDERALISM 187-201 (2010) (discussing the historical origins of concurrent
jurisdiction).
40 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824). Marshall declined to decide
Gibbons on that ground, however.
41 Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319, 325 (1851).
42 Id.
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even further.43 Only in a small area does the dormant Commerce Clause
give the federal government exclusive regulatory authority.44
At roughly the same time as the New Deal Commerce Clause
decisions, the Supreme Court began to view multiple states as having
concurrent regulatory authority over matters not preempted by federal
law. The Court had flirted with imposing an exclusive division of
regulatory authority upon the states, by reading traditional choice-oflaw principles, like lex loci delicti, into the Full Faith and Credit or Due
Process Clauses.45 But it abandoned the effort. Two or more states, it
ultimately concluded, can have the power to extend their law to a single
transaction. For example, a state can extend its tort law to a transaction
even if the harm occurred outside its borders.46
Also around the time of the New Deal Commerce Clause decisions,
the Supreme Court embraced a theory of concurrent personal
jurisdiction. More than one state can assert adjudicative power over a
defendant at any moment. A defendant not served within the forum
state can still be subject to in personam jurisdiction, provided that he
has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.’”47
That courts also abandoned a theory of exclusive regulatory authority
over procedure is less recognized.48 But even in the nineteenth century,
courts began to acknowledge that a sister state might bind up with its
transitory cause of action certain rules — such as time limits or burdens
of proof — that would otherwise be governed by the law of the forum.49
In such cases, the forum respected sister state law. Granted, the
Supreme Court has never determined whether such respect is the
43 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124-25 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 112-13 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 29-31
(1937). A classic account of the move from exclusivity to concurrence is Edward S.
Corwin, Congress’s Power to Prohibit Commerce: A Crucial Constitutional Issue, 18
CORNELL L.Q. 477, 494-96 (1933); see also Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two
Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38 (2004).
44 E.g., Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 108 (1994).
45 N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 376-77 (1918) (reading into Due
Process Clause the rule that the law of the state where the contract was entered into
determines validity and scope of a contract).
46 E.g., Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 500 (1939).
47 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
48 Indeed, it is often still said that federal power over the procedure of federal courts
is exclusive. Barrett, supra note 19, at 838-39; Bellia, supra note 19, at 977 n.167.
49 Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454 (1904); The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 214
(1886); Boyd v. Clark, 8 F. 849, 850 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1881); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 603–605 (1934).
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forum’s constitutional duty.50 But, for our purposes, it is enough that
the sister state was thought to have regulatory power over the forum’s
procedure, even if this power had to yield to competing forum law.
A similar, but even more pronounced, phenomenon occurred in
reverse-Erie cases, in which state courts entertain actions under federal
law. Here, the Supreme Court has not shied away from extending
federal rules to the procedure of state courts. It has held, for example,
that a state court entertaining a federal cause of action must use the
federal rule concerning burdens of proof,51 limitations on actions,52
pleading standards,53 and the appropriate finder of fact.54
Given that a state can regulate the procedure of sister state courts and
the federal government can regulate the procedure of state courts, it
should follow that states can regulate the procedure of federal courts.
And the Supreme Court came to just such a conclusion in Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative. That case concerned a federal court in
South Carolina entertaining a South Carolina negligence action.55 The
Court was faced with the choice between two rules: a South Carolina
rule that gave to the judge the power to decide the factual question of
whether the plaintiff was covered by South Carolina’s workers’
compensation statute or a federal common law rule that gave the matter
to the jury.56

50 The closest the Supreme Court has come to answering this question is Sun Oil v.
Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988). But Sun Oil told us only that the court had the power to
apply its statute of limitations in the absence of competing sister state law, for in his
opinion in Sun Oil Justice Scalia noted that the sister states at issue did not want their
statutes of limitations to follow their causes of action into other court systems. Id. at
729 n.3. The Supreme Court has held that a state court may prefer its shorter procedural
statute of limitations over a sister state’s applicable limitations period. Wells v. Simonds
Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 525-27 (1953). In this scenario, however, the dismissal
usually allows the plaintiff to sue again in another forum. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 19(f) (1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 110 cmt. b
(1971). It is arguable, therefore, that the application of the forum’s procedural law does
not really conflict with sister state law. See RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9.2B (6th ed. 2010).
51 Cent. Vt. Ry. Co. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 512 (1915).
52 Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Burnette, 239 U.S. 199, 202 (1915).
53 Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 295-96 (1949).
54 Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952). For a
discussion of reverse-Erie cases, see Bellia, supra note 19, at 959-63, 976-85, Kevin M.
Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2 (2006), and Michael Steven Green,
The Twin Aims of Erie, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1865, 1909-17 (2013).
55 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 526 (1958).
56 Id. at 533-40.
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Although he ultimately argued that the federal rule should be used,
Justice Brennan noted that if the South Carolina rule were a part of the
South Carolina cause of action upon which the plaintiff sued, the federal
court would be constitutionally obligated to apply it. Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, he argued, puts a duty on federal courts sitting in diversity
to “respect the definition of state-created rights and obligations by the
state courts,” including state rules “bound up with these rights and
obligations.”57 Thus, Brennan recognized that South Carolina has the
power to regulate the procedure of federal courts, although he did not
think that this power was exercised in the case at hand.58
Notice that it does not matter whether Brennan was right that Erie
constitutionally obligates federal courts to yield to state power over
federal procedure. Even if federal courts can create federal procedural
common law that displaces state rules that are bound up with state
causes of action, the fact remains that in the absence of federal
preemption, state law can govern federal procedure of its own force.
Nor can one argue a state’s power to regulate federal procedure is
confined to cases in which a rule is bound up with the state’s cause of
action. It is commonly accepted that a state can have a legitimate
interest in regulating a procedural matter in a sister state court, even
when that court is entertaining an action under forum (or a third state’s)
law. Assume, for example, that two Texans get into an accident in
Texas. Their dispute is adjudicated by a Texas state court. Oklahoma’s
attorney-client privilege can legitimately apply if the relevant
communications took place in Oklahoma or if the attorney-client
relationship was centered in that state.59 To be sure, the Texas court
probably has the constitutional power to prefer its own privilege law,
and some states exercise this power.60 But in the absence of conflicting
forum law, sister state law can govern forum procedure of its own force.
The same state power to regulate the procedure of sister state courts
extends to the procedure of federal courts. Federal courts commonly

57

Id. at 535.
Id. at 535-36.
59 E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Leggat, 904 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Tex. 1995); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 (1971). What is more, state courts apply sister
state law without suggesting that sister states have this regulatory power only because
it is delegated to them by the forum state.
60 E.g., Sterling Fin. Mgmt., LP, v. UBS Painewebber, Inc., 336 Ill. App. 3d 442, 45255 (2002), abrogated by Bridgeview Health Care Ctr., Ltd. v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 10 N.E.3d 902 (Ill. 2014); State v. Lipham, 910 A.2d 388, 390-91 (Me. 2006).
58
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use state privilege law,61 thereby treating federal procedure as subject to
concurrent state and federal regulatory authority.62
To sum up, it is clear that states have some power to extend their law
to the procedure of federal courts. Granted, this power must have limits.
It is possible that a state cannot legitimately regulate the page length of
briefs in federal court, even in the absence of competing federal law. But
for our purposes, it is enough to know that a non-trivial area of federal
procedure is subject to concurrent state and federal regulatory
authority.
3.

Vertical Power

So, Marshall was wrong. Federal power over federal procedure is not
exclusive. Given this fact, how can Marshall’s opinion in Wayman offer
us any guidance?
Let us return to the example of attempted state regulation of federal
procedure that Marshall envisioned in Wayman. In his example, state
officials did not seek to regulate the procedure of federal courts by
binding up a rule into the state’s cause of action, for in such a case the
state’s rule would have extended to all court systems — federal and
sister state — that entertained the action.63 An example would be
Oklahoma officials binding up section 1101.1(B)(3) into contract
actions under Oklahoma law. As represented in Figure 1, the scope of
section 1101.1(B)(3) would extend to all cases in which the plaintiff
sues under Oklahoma contract law, whether the case is before an
Oklahoma state court, a federal court in Oklahoma, or a federal or state
court in a sister state.

61 E.g., FED. R. EVID. 501; see H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 3, 9 (1973), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7082 (“The rationale underlying the proviso is that federal law
should not supersede that of the States in substantive areas such as privilege absent a
compelling reason.”). Notice that state law is applied without the suggestion that states
have this power only because it is delegated to them by federal law.
62 Indeed, it is clear that states have concurrent lawmaking power in precisely the
area where Marshall claimed federal power was exclusive, namely the execution of a
federal judgment by a federal court. See infra Part III.C. Federal courts currently use
state law concerning such enforcement. FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a). Nor can this be
understood as the incorporation of state law into federal law. An independent suit to
collect a federal judgment is a state law action that lacks federal subject matter
jurisdiction, unless the parties are diverse. Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U.S. 586, 587-88
(1888).
63 See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 49-50 (1825).
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Nor did Marshall imagine a state’s officials identifying a matter of
interest independent of the state’s cause of action and extending a state
law to all court systems, whether federal or sister state, in which the
matter arises. An example would be Oklahoma officials extending their
law on the attorney-client privilege to all cases involving
communications between an attorney and client in Oklahoma, as
represented in Figure 2.
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Figure 2
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In both of these examples, Oklahoma’s regulation of the procedure of
other court systems is coordinate — it extends to any court system,
whether federal or sister state, in which the source of Oklahoma’s
regulatory interest can be found. But Marshall imagined a state’s officials
extending their law solely to federal courts.64 This would occur if
Oklahoma officials imposed the rule in section 1101.1(B)(3) on all
contract actions brought in federal court within the state (Figure 3).

64

Id.
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Figure 3
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Although Marshall was wrong about the scope of state power over
federal procedure, I think he was right that the particular example of
state regulation of federal procedure he envisioned in Wayman was
impermissible. And I also think he was right that it is impermissible for
state officials to attempt such regulation indirectly, by taking laws that
apply to their own courts and extending them to federal courts within
the state. Oklahoma officials cannot effectuate the regulations
illustrated in Figure 3 indirectly, by taking section 1101.1(B)(3) —
which, we can assume, applies to all contract actions in Oklahoma state
court, even when brought under the law of another sovereign65 — and
extending it to all federal courts in Oklahoma (Figure 4).

65 But see Boyd Rosene & Assocs., Inc. v. Kansas Mun. Gas Agency, 174 F.3d 1115,
1119 n.4 (10th Cir. 1999).
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Figure 4
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The fact that states have concurrent authority over federal procedure
does not mean that they have the vertical power envisioned in Marshall’s
example in Wayman. I will call the principle that states lack such
vertical power the “principle of coordinancy.”
To repeat, the principle of coordinancy denies that states can
legitimately extend their law vertically to federal courts within their
borders. Oklahoma can claim power over federal procedure only on the
basis of an interest that would justify coordinate extension of its law —
extension that would include courts in sister states in which
Oklahoma’s interest is present and that would exclude cases before
federal courts within Oklahoma in which Oklahoma’s interest is absent.
B. Original v. Delegated Power
But the principle of coordinancy needs further clarification. The
principle denies that states have an original vertical power over the
procedure of federal courts. It does not deny that federal law might
delegate such vertical power to a state.66 Consider Rule 4(e) of the
66 In this Article, I assume that there is a meaningful distinction between state law
applying to federal procedure of its own force and state standards applying to federal
procedure because the state has been delegated power by federal law. Under the
principle, state law cannot apply vertically to federal procedure of its own force, but it
can apply vertically if the state is exercising delegated federal power. Some courts and
legal scholars have questioned the distinction. See, e.g., O’Melveny & Myers v. Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 U.S. 79, 85 (1994) (stating that the difference between applying
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, under which service on an individual
in a suit in federal district court is adequate if it is in accordance with
the law of the state where the district court is located.67 Because of this
rule, a state has the power to make a method of service permissible in
federal courts within its borders. But it has this power only because
federal law references forum state law.68
Although, as we have seen, Marshall’s position is that federal power
over procedure is exclusive, in Wayman he also made it clear that this
exclusivity of federal power does not necessarily entail its nondelegability. What he rejected was “an original inherent power in the
state legislatures, independent of any act of Congress, to control the
modes of proceeding in suits depending in the courts of the United
States.”69 At the time, the Process Act of 1792 directed federal courts to
adopt the “forms of writs and execution . . . and modes of process” of
the forum state.70 To the extent that the Act was read as delegating to
states regulatory power over federal courts within their borders, such
power was compatible with the exclusivity of federal power over federal
procedure to which Marshall was committed.
state law of its own force and adopting it as the federal rule of decision “is of only
theoretical interest”); Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 n.3 (1988)
(noting that, at least in the case at issue, “the distinction between displacement of state
law and displacement of federal law’s incorporation of state law” does not “make[] a
practical difference”); Martin H. Redish, Continuing the Erie Debate: A Response to
Westen and Lehman, 78 MICH. L. REV. 959, 961 (1980) (claiming that the distinction is
“metaphysical”). In general, however, this is in circumstances in which both are
conceded to be permissible. Even in such cases, the distinction is meaningful. See
Michael Steven Green, Erie’s International Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1485, 1500 (2013).
But when, as is the case here, state law cannot apply of its force and the only way that
that state standard can be used is through delegation, the distinction is unquestionably
a meaningful one.
67 Service is also adequate if it is in accordance with the law of the state where
service is effected. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e).
68 I will treat as equivalent federal power being delegated to a state and state law
standards being dynamically incorporated into federal law. One might argue, however,
that the two are distinct. To delegate is to establish a relationship of authorization to
the delegatee, a relationship of which the delegatee is aware and can intentionally take
advantage. Dynamic incorporation of a standard, in contrast, need not involve any
awareness of the dynamic incorporation by the author of the incorporated standard. In
many cases in which federal law references forum state law, there is arguably dynamic
incorporation, not delegation. The federal government does not address the state and
grant it power and the state generally does not create standards with the effect on federal
law in mind.
69 Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 49 (emphasis added).
70 Process Act of 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276. This continued the practice of
borrowing forum state procedure established in the Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1
Stat. 93, 93.
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To be sure, Marshall had independent doubts about the capacity of
Congress to delegate its power over federal procedure to the states.71 He
concluded that the conformity to forum state law demanded by the
Process Act had to be static, not dynamic: the Act obligated federal
courts to use forum state law only as it existed in 1789, when the first
Process Act was enacted.72 For this reason, the Kentucky statute at issue
in Wayman, which was enacted after 1789, did not fall within the
Conformity Act’s scope.73
Congress accepted this limitation on its power when it enacted the
Process Acts of 1828 and 1842, by providing that the procedure in
common law suits in federal courts should be the same as was “then”
used in the forum state.74 Dynamic conformity to forum state law was
put in place only with the Conformity Act of 1872,75 when scruples
about delegation of congressional power had relaxed.76
In light of this modern relaxed view about Congress’s power to
delegate its power to the states, sensitivity to the distinction between a
state exercising an original and a delegated vertical power over federal
procedure is especially important. The principle I defend here is solely
that states lack an original vertical power. I do not deny that states might
have vertical power when federal law delegates it to them.
C. No Power v. Defeasible Power
It is also important to distinguish two senses in which a state might
lack an original vertical power to regulate the procedure of federal
courts: it might utterly lack such power, even in the absence of
conflicting federal law, or it might lack such power only when
conflicting federal law exists.
Marshall made it clear in Wayman that he thought the forum state has
no power to regulate the procedure of federal courts.77 His point was
not the weaker one that state power over federal procedure must yield
71

Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 47-48.
Id. at 21, 49-50.
73 Id.
74 Process Act of 1842, ch. 109, 5 Stat. 499, 499; Process Act of 1828, ch. 68, § 1, 4
Stat. 278, 278-80.
75 Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197.
76 For a discussion, see Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 103, 138-46 (2008). Another federal law that might be understood to have
delegated to the states a vertical power over federal procedure is the Rules of Decision
Act. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652 (2013)). I discuss Marshall’s interpretation of the Act in infra Part II.A.3.
77 See supra Part I.A.1.
72
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to conflicting federal law. Because he thought federal authority over
federal procedure was exclusive, the existence of a conflicting federal
rule was irrelevant to state power. Granted, there was a competing
federal rule in Wayman. Federal courts had created their own methods
of executing judgments, methods that were incompatible with the
Kentucky statute.78 But he would have considered state law inapplicable
even if no such federal rule existed. In such a case, the exclusivity of
federal regulatory authority, combined with the lack of any power to
delegate lawmaking power to the states, would compel the federal
government to create applicable law, on pain of leaving the matter
subject to no regulation at all.
Of course, in this Article I do not adopt Marshall’s position that
federal regulatory authority over the procedure of federal courts is
exclusive (or nondelegable). I deny only that states have vertical
regulatory authority. But it is important to recognize that the principle
of coordinancy is a complete prohibition on such vertical power, not
merely a claim that vertical power must yield to competing federal law.
Thus, if the only state regulation of federal procedure is vertical, the
federal government will be compelled to create applicable federal law or
delegate lawmaking power to the state. To do neither would mean
creating an anarchistic situation in which there was no law on the
matter.
II.

WHY THE PRINCIPLE MATTERS

With the principle of coordinancy clarified, one might question
whether it is a matter of importance. How often does the issue of vertical
state power arise? In fact, it is a frequent, although hitherto unnoticed,
factor when a federal court must choose whether federal or forum state
rules govern a procedural matter.
A. The Principle in “Relatively Unguided” Erie Cases
One set of examples arise in so-called “relatively unguided” Erie
choices,79 in which a federal court entertaining a non-federal cause of
action80 attempts to determine whether it should use a federal common
law rule of procedure uniform across all federal courts or the rule that

78 This rule was created under the authority given to federal courts by the Judiciary
Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83 and the Judiciary Act of 1793, ch. 22, § 7, 1 Stat.
333, 335.
79 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
80 For example, when sitting in diversity or supplemental jurisdiction.
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would be used by a forum state court. I will begin by spelling out the
considerations federal courts are required to take into account when
making relatively unguided Erie choices. I will then identify the many
examples in which federal courts or legal scholars discussing such cases
have assumed that states have vertical power over federal procedure,
contrary to the principle of coordinancy.
1.

Making Relatively Unguided Erie Choices

Consider the following scenario (modeled after Scottsdale Insurance
Co. v. Tolliver81). A federal court in Oklahoma sitting in diversity is
entertaining an Oklahoma contract action. The plaintiff refuses an offer
of settlement by the defendant. At trial, the defendant prevails. Under
section 1101.1(B)(3), the defendant is entitled to attorney’s fees from
the plaintiff.82 There is no federal statute or Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure governing the matter.83 But under a federal common law rule
used in federal question cases, each party bears his own attorney’s fees,
even if an offer of settlement is refused. Which rule should the federal
court use?
One essential consideration in answering this question is whether
using the federal common law rule would violate the twin aims of the
Erie rule, that is, whether it would generate “forum shopping” and “the
inequitable administration of the laws.”84 The forum-shopping test is
reasonably clear. As the Court described it in Hanna v. Plumer, the
question is whether the difference between the uniform federal common
law rule being used in federal court and the state’s rule being used in
state court would influence plaintiffs’ decisions about whether to sue in
a federal or forum state court (or defendants’ choice about whether to
remove).85 In the Tolliver case, the difference between the federal and
the Oklahoma rule would likely encourage forum shopping,86 so the
first of the twin aims recommends that the federal court use the
Oklahoma rule.

81 636 F.3d 1273, 1275 (10th Cir. 2011). I have changed the facts slightly for
simplicity’s sake.
82 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1101.1(B)(3) (2014).
83 In particular, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 does not control the issue. See
Tolliver, 636 F.3d at 1277-79.
84 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. Although the Court flirted with a strictly outcomedeterminative test in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945), it abandoned
such a test in Hanna.
85 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.
86 Tolliver, 636 F.3d at 1280.
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The purpose of the second of the twin aims — avoiding the
inequitable administration of the laws — is a bit murkier. The general
idea, however, is that it is unfair for parties to be submitted to
substantially different procedural rules solely due to “the accident of
diversity of citizenship.”87 The truth, however, is that when federal
courts determine whether the second aim is implicated, they generally
rely on the first. It is rare for a court to conclude that forum shopping
is not a problem but inequity is, or vice versa.88
The twin aims are not the only considerations in a relatively unguided
Erie case. Even if the twin aims suggest using the forum state’s rule,
using a uniform federal common law rule might still be appropriate, if,
as the Court put it in Byrd, there are “countervailing” federal interests.89
In Byrd, the Court held that the federal court should use a uniform
federal common law rule, under which a jury would decide the factual
question of whether the plaintiff’s action was covered by South
Carolina’s workers’ compensation statute, instead of a South Carolina
rule that gave the question to the judge. The reason was that “the federal
policy favoring jury decisions of disputed fact questions” overrode the
need for uniformity with South Carolina state courts.90
It is essential in understanding the twin aims to recognize that they
recommend using the forum state’s standard without regard to what the
forum state’s officials would say about the scope of their rule. Consider
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, in which the Supreme Court held that a
federal court in New York entertaining New York fraud actions should
use New York’s limitations period for fraud, not a federal equity
doctrine of laches.91 One searches in vain in Justice Frankfurter’s
opinion in York for any suggestion that the New York limitations period

87 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). Or, one might
add, it is unfair for the parties to be submitted to substantially different rules due to any
other contingent fact that would give their dispute federal jurisdiction, including
supplemental jurisdiction and bankruptcy. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487
U.S. 22, 40 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Green, supra note 54, at 1917-34.
88 Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie After Gasperini, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 1637, 1652 (1998). A counter-example is Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S.
740, 753 (1980), which claimed that the inequity (but not forum-shopping) test was
violated because the actual parties in the case did not engage in forum shopping. But
the forum-shopping test is about whether the difference between procedural rules
would in general lead to forum shopping, not whether it did in the particular case. See
Patrick Woolley, The Sources of Federal Preclusion Law After Semtek, 72 U. CIN. L. REV.
527, 548-49 (2003).
89 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).
90 Id. at 538.
91 Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110, 119 (1945).
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actually applies of its own force in federal court.92 The intention of New
York officials was irrelevant. New York’s limitations period was used in
York because of federal interests in procedural uniformity.93
Indeed, the twin aims can recommend that the forum state’s rule be
used even in the face of evidence that state officials do not care whether
their rule is used by federal courts. For example, in Woods v. Interstate
Realty Co.,94 the Supreme Court held that a federal court sitting in
diversity in Mississippi should abide by a Mississippi statute requiring
non-Mississippi corporations doing business in the state to register
before bringing a lawsuit “in any of the courts of this state.”95 Reviewing
Mississippi state court decisions, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit had concluded that the phrase “courts of this state” referred only
to Mississippi state courts, not federal courts.96 But the Supreme Court
held that the statute should be followed in federal court anyway.97
Understood as the claim that the Mississippi statute applied of its own
force in federal court, the Supreme Court’s decision looks like a
disturbing refusal, reminiscent of Swift v. Tyson,98 to take Mississippi
state courts to be the final arbiters of the scope of Mississippi law. This
is how Justice Jackson, in his dissent, read the Court’s decision. As he
put it, “we seem to be doing the very thing we profess to avoid — that
is, give the state law a different meaning in federal court than the state
courts have given it.”99
But this misreads the Court’s purpose. Rather than being concerned
about state power, the Court was vindicating federal interests in
procedural uniformity with forum state courts.100 The Court was really
choosing between two federal common law rules, each recommended

92

See id. at 108-09.
Green, supra note 54, at 1887-1904.
94 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
95 See id. at 536 & n.1; see also Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for
Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 357-58 (1980).
96 Interstate Realty Co. v. Woods, 168 F.2d 701, 704-05 (5th Cir. 1948).
97 Woods, 337 U.S. at 537-38.
98 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842).
99 Woods, 337 U.S. at 539 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
100 Id. at 538 (majority opinion) (“The contrary result would create discriminations
against citizens of the State in favor of those authorized to invoke the diversity
jurisdiction of the federal courts.”); see also Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109
(1945) (“The nub of the policy that underlies Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins is that for the same
transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of
in a State court a block away, should not lead to a substantially different result.”). For
a discussion of these federal interests, see Green, supra note 54, at 1887-1904.
93
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by federal interests — one that is uniform across federal courts and one
that incorporates forum state law.101
Justice Scalia offered just such a reading of the twin aims in Semtek
International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.102 Because Scalia assumed
(probably wrongly103) that the preclusive effect of the dismissal of a
California state law action by a federal court in California is a matter of
exclusive federal regulatory authority,104 California’s interests were
irrelevant. Nevertheless, he concluded that the federal court should
adopt “as the federally prescribed rule of decision, the law that would
be applied by state courts in the State in which the federal diversity
court sits.”105 Thus, California standards were incorporated into a
federal common law rule.
But to say that the twin aims are not about respect for state regulatory
interests does not mean that such interests are irrelevant. As we have
seen, Byrd’s bound-up test offers a place in the relatively unguided Erie
analysis for state lawmaking power.106 Before addressing vertical
uniformity and countervailing federal interests in Byrd, Justice Brennan
noted that a threshold question was whether the state rule was part of
the cause of action upon which the plaintiff sued.107 If it was, he argued,
the federal court was constitutionally obligated to apply the rule.108 Erie
R. Co. v. Tompkins puts a duty on federal courts sitting in diversity to
“respect the definition of state-created rights and obligations by the
state courts,” including state rules “bound up with these rights and
obligations.”109
Notice that the state power over federal procedure identified in Byrd’s
bound-up test satisfies the principle of coordinancy. The question is

101

Green, supra note 54, at 1887-1904.
531 U.S. 497, 508-09 (2001).
103 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Linda J. Silberman, Interjurisdictional
Implications of the Entire Controversy Doctrine, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 123, 139-52 (1996);
Howard M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 MICH. L. REV. 945, 1003-04
(1998).
104 Semtek, 531 U.S. at 509.
105 Id.
106 Although the Court has not mentioned the Byrd bound-up test by name since, it
clearly relies upon the notion that state rules bound up with state causes of action
should be respected by federal courts entertaining such actions. See infra Part II.A.
Furthermore, the Byrd test has been mentioned by name by lower federal courts. E.g.,
All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants, 645 F.3d 329, 336 (5th Cir. 2011); Bos. Gas Co. v.
Century Indem. Co., 529 F.3d 8, 21 (1st Cir. 2008).
107 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 535 (1958).
108 Id.
109 Id.
102
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whether the state’s rule is part of the cause of action upon which the
plaintiff sues. So understood, the state’s rule would extend coordinately
to any court, including a sister-state court, that entertained the state’s
cause of action. And the state’s rule would not extend to actions under
sister state law brought in federal courts within the state.
An example of a federal court relying on Byrd’s bound-up test is
Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. Tolliver.110 As we have seen, the question in
Tolliver was whether a federal court in Oklahoma entertaining an
Oklahoma breach of contract action should use one of two rules. The
first was a uniform federal common law rule, according to which each
party bears his own attorney’s fees. The second was a rule drawn from
Oklahoma law, under which the defendant is entitled to attorney’s fees
from a losing plaintiff who refused an offer of settlement.111 In Tolliver,
the federal court did not merely appeal to the twin aims as a reason for
using the Oklahoma rule.112 It also suggested that the Oklahoma rule
was bound up with the Oklahoma contract action upon which the
plaintiff sued. So interpreted, the rule should follow Oklahoma contract
actions into federal and state courts in sister states and should not apply
to sister state contract actions brought in federal or state court in
Oklahoma.113
When a federal court entertains a cause of action under forum state
law, the twin aims and Byrd’s bound-up test point to the same state’s
law. But when the plaintiff sues under sister state law, they can point in
different directions. Assume a federal court in New York entertains a
Pennsylvania cause of action. The Byrd test would recommend respect
for Pennsylvania rules that are bound up with the action, whereas the
twin aims would recommend uniformity with New York state courts.

110

636 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 2011).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1101.1(B)(3) (2014).
112 Tolliver, 636 F.3d at 1278-82.
113 For example, the court mentioned, as relevant to its decision, Boyd Rosene &
Associates, Inc. v. Kansas Municipal Gas Agency, 174 F.3d 1115, 1119 n.4 (10th Cir.
1999), in which another attorney’s fee provision of the statute was not applied by a
federal court sitting in diversity in Oklahoma to a Kansas cause of action because the
provision was considered to be bound up with Oklahoma contract actions. Boyd made
it clear that the statute would not merely be inapplicable in Oklahoma courts to causes
of action under sister state law, but also applicable in sister state courts entertaining
Oklahoma contract actions. See Boyd, 174 F.3d at 1124-25 (criticizing Smithco Eng’g,
Inc. v. Int’l Fabricators, Inc., 775 P.2d 1011, 1017-19 (Wyo. 1989)). In Smithco, the
Wyoming Supreme Court considered the Oklahoma statute inapplicable to an
Oklahoma contract action brought in Wyoming state court. See Smithco, 775 P.2d at
1017-19.
111
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To the extent that New York state courts preferred their own rule over
Pennsylvania’s, the Byrd test and the twin aims would conflict.114
But even when Byrd’s bound-up test and the twin aims both point to
the forum state’s standard, they remain independent reasons for the
standard to be used. The twin aims can recommend that forum state
rules be borrowed, even if there is no evidence that the state is interested
in its rule applying outside of its own court system. And if the federal
court is uncertain about whether the difference between federal and
forum state procedure would lead to forum shopping and litigant
inequity, the appeal to state interests can be crucial in recommending
the forum state rule over uniform federal procedural common law.
An example of the latter scenario is Gasperini v. Center for Humanities,
Inc.115 Gasperini concerned two relatively unguided Erie questions. The
first, which concerns us here, was about the standard that a federal
district court in New York hearing an action under New York law
should use for determining whether the damages awarded by the jury
were excessive.116 Should it use New York’s standard, under which the
trial court looks to whether the award “deviates materially from what
would be reasonable compensation”?117 Or should it use the more
generous federal common law standard, under which the award should
be overturned by the trial court only if it was “so excessive as to shock
the judicial conscience”?118
Justices Ginsburg and Stevens argued that New York’s materiallydeviates standard was akin to a cap on damages.119 Significantly, caps
on damages are commonly thought to be bound up with a state’s causes
of action, following them into other court systems.120 It is not
surprising, therefore, that Ginsburg and Stevens concluded that the
standard should be used by the district court.121 In contrast, Scalia, who
argued that New York’s standard was not bound up with the cause of
action, concluded that under a relatively unguided Erie analysis the
114

Green, supra note 54, at 1881-87.
518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996).
116 The second concerned the standard of review that should be used by a federal
court of appeals for reviewing the district court’s decision. Id. at 437-39.
117 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(c) (MCKINNEY 1995) (explaining how, although referring to
appeals, the standard had been read by New York state courts to apply to trial courts).
118 Scala v. Moore McCormack Lines, Inc., 985 F.2d 680, 683 & n.7 (2d Cir. 1993)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Nairn v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 837
F.2d 565, 567 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying federal standard in FELA case).
119 Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 428-29; id. at 439-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120 Id. at 428-29 (majority opinion); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
412 cmt. a (1934).
121 Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 438-39; id. at 439-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115
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district court should use the federal standard.122 In coming to different
conclusions about how the relatively unguided Erie analysis should turn
out, the Justices’ differing views about New York’s interests clearly
played a role.
2.

Federal Courts Rejecting the Principle

As we have seen, Byrd’s bound-up test satisfies the principle of
coordinancy. Given this fact, how is the principle relevant to how
relatively unguided Erie choices are decided? The principle is
implicated when federal courts assume that forum state officials intend
their rule to apply in federal court even though its scope is not limited
by a locus of forum state interest that would extend it to sister state
courts. The forum state rule is instead “procedural” in the sense that it
applies to all relevant actions over which the state’s courts have
jurisdiction. And yet, it is argued, the rule with the same “procedural”
scope extends to federal courts within the state.
The clearest example is Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.123
Cohen involved a federal court in New Jersey entertaining a shareholder
derivative action brought by a New York domiciliary on behalf of a
Delaware corporation against the corporation’s officers and directors.124
The question facing the Court was whether the federal court should use
a New Jersey statute requiring the plaintiff to post a bond as security for
the defendant’s attorney’s fees if the action was unsuccessful.125 No one
suggested that the New Jersey statute would have applied had the case
been litigated in sister state courts. It is unlikely that the statute was
bound up with New Jersey derivative actions. The statute applied to “any
action instituted or maintained in the right of any domestic or foreign
corporation by the holder.”126 Since a derivative action maintained in the
right of a foreign corporation would likely be under foreign law, the
statute, by its own terms, applied in New Jersey courts to derivative
actions under foreign (including sister-state) law. Granted, the statute
could have created two rules: one applicable in New Jersey state courts to
all derivative actions, even those under sister state law (Rule 1), and one
bound up with New Jersey derivative actions that followed them into
122 Id. at 463-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia ultimately argued that the relatively
unguided Erie analysis was irrelevant to the case, however, because the matter was
governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Id. at 468.
123 337 U.S. 541, 557 (1949).
124 Id. at 543.
125 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-15 to 17 (West 1945); Cohen, 337 U.S. at 554.
126 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-15.
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sister state and federal courts (Rule 2). Even so, the statute could not have
been bound up with the plaintiff’s cause of action in Cohen since that
action was probably under Delaware, not New Jersey, law (Figure 5).127
Figure 5
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The only way that the New Jersey statute could have extended to the
federal court in Cohen in a manner that was compatible with the
principle of coordinancy is if the second rule was tied to some other
locus of New Jersey interest in connection with derivative actions, such
as the New Jersey domicile of a defendant, that was present in the Cohen
case (Figure 6).

127 Cohen, 337 U.S. at 554; Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 7 F.R.D. 352, 35657 (D.N.J. 1947).
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Figure 6
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But there was no evidence for such an extraordinary reading, and no
one ever suggested it.
Although the Supreme Court could have justified its decision in
Cohen based on federal interests in procedural uniformity with forum
state courts (subsequently described in Hanna as the twin aims), it
nevertheless concluded that the statute was “substantive,” in the sense
of creating “a new liability where none existed before.”128 Although this
liability did not extend to sister state courts, it extended to federal courts
in New Jersey (Figure 7). This amounts to a rejection of the principle
of coordinancy.

128

Cohen, 337 U.S. at 555.
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Figure 7
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Cohen is probably the most unambiguous example of a federal court
rejecting the principle in a relatively unguided Erie case. But there are
many others. In each, a federal court points to state interests (instead
of, or in addition to, the twin aims) as a reason for a forum state rule to
be used in federal court in the state, without reading the scope of the
rule as tied to a locus of forum state interest that would justify its
application in sister state courts.
One example is Judge Posner’s discussion of statutes of limitations in
diversity cases in Hemmings v. Barian:
When a federal court borrows a state statute of limitations for
use in connection with a federal statute that does not have its
own statute of limitations, the court is not applying state law; it
is applying federal law. It looks to state law for guidance . . . The
analysis would, however, be different if [we were sitting in]
diversity rather than federal question . . . . For purposes of the
Erie doctrine the statute of limitations is substantive rather than
procedural, and the federal court therefore applies state law —
it doesn’t just borrow it [citing Guaranty Trust v. York].129
If New York’s statute of limitations applied of its own force in York, the
principle would have been violated. It is true that the statute might have
been bound up with the New York fraud actions such that it followed
them into other court systems, including sister state courts (Figure 8).
129

Hemmings v. Barian, 822 F.2d 688, 689-90 (7th Cir. 1987).
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Figure 8
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But in his opinion in York, Justice Frankfurter disclaimed such an
interpretation of the statute. He took great pains to argue that the
characterization of New York’s statute of limitations as substantive or
procedural for choice-of-law purposes — that is, as applicable or
inapplicable in sister state courts — was irrelevant to the question faced
by the Court.130 Furthermore, the evidence from New York state courts
was against interpreting the statute as bound up with New York actions,
for the statute had been applied by New York state courts to actions
under the laws of other sovereigns.131
Once again, it is possible that New York’s statute created two
limitations periods: one meant to apply only in New York state courts,
even to fraud actions under other sovereigns’ laws (Rule 1), and one
tied to New York fraud actions and so meant to follow them into other
court systems (Rule 2) (Figure 9).132

130

Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945).
Leonor v. Ingenio Porvenir C. por A., 34 N.Y.S.2d 705, 717-78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1942) (applying section 48 to action under law of Dominican Republic); Hifler v.
Calmac Oil & Gas Corp., 10 N.Y.S.2d 531, 544 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1939) (applying section
53 to action under Pennsylvania law); see also Anglo Cal. Nat’l Bank of S.F. v. Klein,
296 N.Y.S. 191, 202 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1936) (describing section 48 as procedural).
132 Drinan v. A.J. Lindemann & Hoverson Co., 238 F.2d 72, 75-76 (7th Cir. 1956);
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 397 cmt. b (1934); 3 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A
TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 605.1 (1935); GEORGE WILFRED STUMBERG,
PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 144-45, 149 n.65 (3d ed. 1963).
131
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Figure 9
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But Posner offers no arguments for such a reading and there is no
evidence in the Supreme Court’s opinion in York or in New York state
court decisions in favor of it. What is more, there are many cases in
which federal courts, citing York, have used the forum state’s statute of
limitations when entertaining causes of action under sister state law.133
Posner does not exclude such cases, so he must think that they are also
examples of forum state law applying of its own force in federal court.
Posner, therefore, must think that New York claimed vertical regulatory
power over federal courts in York, in violation of the principle of
coordinancy (Figure 10).

133 E.g., Flowers v. Carville, 310 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2002); MedCap Corp. v.
Betsy Johnson Health Care Sys., Inc., 16 F. App’x 180, 182 (4th Cir. 2001); Ferens v.
Deere & Co., 862 F.2d 31, 34 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that under York, a federal court
in Mississippi should apply Mississippi’s statute of limitations for an action under
Pennsylvania law); Hoffa v. Fitzsimmons, 673 F.2d 1345, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Morson v. Kreindler & Kreindler, LLP, 814 F. Supp. 2d 220, 225 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); Nat’l
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 357 F. Supp. 2d 287, 292 (D.D.C. 2005).
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Figure 10
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Another example of a federal court rejecting the principle in a
relatively unguided Erie case is Chamberlain v. Giampapa.134 In
Chamberlain, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that
a federal court in New Jersey entertaining a medical malpractice action
under New Jersey law was obligated to use a New Jersey affidavit of
merit statute, which required the plaintiff to file an affidavit from an
expert assuring that there is support for the malpractice claim.135 One
ground for this conclusion was the twin aims. If federal courts did not
require affidavits, plaintiffs with malpractice actions would favor federal
over state court.136 But the court also mentioned New Jersey’s
substantive interest in “early dismissal of meritless lawsuits.”137 It was
doubtful that New Jersey’s interest was tied to New Jersey medical
malpractice actions. New Jersey state courts had held that the statute
applies to malpractice actions under sister state law brought in state
court in New Jersey.138 If New Jersey’s interests in early dismissal of
meritless lawsuits did not extend to sister state courts entertaining New
Jersey malpractice actions but did extend to federal courts in New Jersey

134

210 F.3d 154, 158-59 (3d Cir. 2000).
Id. at 158-61.
136 Id. at 161.
137 Id.
138 Shamrock Lacrosse, Inc. v. Klehr, Harrison, Harvey, Branzburg & Ellers, LLP, 3
A.3d 518, 532-33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (applying statute despite recognizing
that New Jersey malpractice law may not apply).
135
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(even when entertaining malpractice actions under the law of states
other than New Jersey), the principle of coordinancy must be
violated.139
Finally, there are opinions whose authors, although not rejecting the
principle, would be compelled to do so when faced with further
evidence from state court decisions. An example is Gasperini v. Center
for Humanities, Inc.140 As we have seen, one issue in Gasperini was
whether a federal district court in New York entertaining a New York
cause of action should use a New York rule, under which the damages
awarded by a jury are excessive if they “deviate[] materially from what
would be reasonable compensation,” or a federal common law rule,
under which a damages award should be overturned only if it “was so
excessive that it ‘shocked the conscience of the court.’”141 Justices
Ginsburg and Stevens treated the New York rule as akin to a cap on
damages, which is commonly considered to be bound up with a state’s
cause of action, following it into sister state courts.142 If so, the New
York regulatory interests to which Ginsburg and Stevens appealed did
not violate the principle.
But there was evidence against New York’s standard being bound up
with the plaintiff’s cause of action.143 New York state courts had applied
139 Another example is Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980). In Walker,
the Supreme Court held that a federal court sitting in diversity in Oklahoma should use
an Oklahoma rule specifying that a statute of limitations is tolled upon service on the
defendant, rather than the federal common law rule that it is tolled upon filing of the
summons and complaint. The federal rule was held to be a matter of federal common
law rather than governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3, because the Federal Rule
and the state rule did not directly conflict. Id. at 752. Although the Court appealed to
the twin aims in favor of its conclusion, it also considered Oklahoma’s interests,
including the “substantive decision by that State” in favor of “actual service on, and
accordingly actual notice by, the defendant.” Id. at 751. In so doing, it suggested that
Oklahoma had the power to extend its rule to federal court. Since the plaintiff’s cause
of action arose in Oklahoma, and thus he was probably suing under Oklahoma law in
federal court, Oklahoma could have extended its tolling rule to the federal court in a
manner that was compatible with the principle of coordinancy, by binding the rule up
with the plaintiff’s Oklahoma cause of action. But statutes of limitations are generally
understood as procedural under Oklahoma law. See Estate of Speake, 743 P.2d 648, 652
(Okla. 1987). Thus, it is unlikely that the tolling rule was understood by Oklahoma
officials as bound up with the plaintiff’s Oklahoma action, such that it followed the
action into sister state courts. Accordingly, for Oklahoma law to have regulated federal
procedure of its own force in the Walker case, as the Court suggests, the principle would
have had to have been violated.
140 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
141 Id. at 422-25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
142 Id. at 428-29; id. at 439-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143 The legislative history on the matter, which was emphasized by Ginsburg and
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the New York standard to causes of action under the law of other
sovereigns, a fact that was not merely ignored in the opinions in
Gasperini but that has also not (to my knowledge) been discussed in the
extensive literature on the case. Although I was not able to find a case
in which New York state courts applied (or refused to apply) the New
York standard to sister state actions, they have used their standard,
rather than the federal shocks-the-conscience standard, when
entertaining federal causes of actions, such as the Federal Employers
Liability Act and the Jones Act.144 If New York’s standard were bound
up with New York causes of action, it would not apply to actions under
federal law.
Again, it is possible that New York might have two standards: one
applicable to all actions in New York state courts and one intended to
follow New York causes of action into sister state and federal courts. But
this is incompatible with cases in which federal courts sitting in New
York, citing Gasperini, have used the New York standard for causes of
action not under New York law.145 To the extent that the New York
standard genuinely applies in federal courts of its own force in such
cases, New York must be vertically regulating the procedure of federal
courts, in violation of the principle of coordinancy.

Stevens, was compatible with either reading. Id. at 422-25 (majority opinion)
(discussing legislative history); id. at 439-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same). For Justice
Scalia’s alternative reading on the basis of the same evidence, see id. at 464-65 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (reading the provision as not akin to a cap on damages).
144 See, e.g., Sneddon v. CSX Transp., 848 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503-04 (App. Div. 2007)
(applying New York standard to a FELA action); Hardial v. City of New York, 600
N.Y.S.2d 15, 15-16 (App. Div. 1993) (applying New York standard to a Jones Act
action); Eschberger v. Consol. Rail Corp., 572 N.Y.S.2d 539, 540 (App. Div. 1991)
(same). To be sure, some New York state courts have applied the federal shocks-theconscience standard to FELA and Jones Act actions. See, e.g., Brown v. Reinauer Transp.
Cos., 886 N.Y.S.2d 769, 776 (App. Div. 2009) (applying federal standard to a Jones Act
action); Hotaling v. CSX Transp., 773 N.Y.S.2d 755, 761 (App. Div. 2004) (applying
federal standard to a FELA action). This disagreement does not appear to have been
recognized by New York state courts. But these courts may have applied the federal
standard, not because they thought the New York standard was inapplicable to federal
causes of action, but because they thought that the federal shocks-the-conscience
standard was intended by federal authorities to follow federal causes of action into state
court. Faced with a conflict between New York and federal law, they would have been
forced to apply federal law. The difference of opinion among New York state courts on
FELA and Jones Act cases is probably driven, therefore, solely by differing views
concerning whether the federal standard is bound up with federal causes of action (a
matter about which the Supreme Court has given no guidance).
145 Cantu v. Flanigan, 705 F. Supp. 2d 220, 225-26 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (applying New
York standard to an action under Mexican law).
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Theoretical Rejections of the Principle

The appeal to vertical state power in relatively unguided Erie choices
is even more pronounced among legal academics, some of whom
recommend an abandonment of the twin aims entirely. For example,
Allan Stein has argued that in the absence of forum state regulatory
interests there is no reason for a federal court to use standards from
forum state law:
The primary inquiry . . . ought to be whether there has been a
usurpation of a state regulatory prerogative, not whether all
litigants were treated “equally.” If a state has not attempted to
“vest” a litigant with a right to a particular procedure, it is
nonsense to view the federal departure from that procedure as
unfair to the party.146
Without federal interests in uniformity of procedure between federal
and forum state courts, the only reason a federal court has to use the
forum state’s rules is the forum state’s regulatory interests.147 And if
these interests are directed only at federal courts within the state, the
principle of coordinancy would be violated.
Another piece of evidence that many, perhaps even most, Erie
scholars and federal courts implicitly reject the principle is that such a
rejection follows logically from the combination of two theses to which
they are generally committed.
The first thesis concerns the Rules of Decision Act (“RDA”), which
states that “[t]he laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution, or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in
civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply.”148 According to the first thesis, the RDA merely instructs federal
146 Allan R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100 YALE L.J. 1935, 1955 (1991); see also id.
at 1941. Richard Freer has made the same point: “If applying state law would not
advance a state policy, there is no reason for the federal court to do so, even if failing to
do so would be outcome determinative.” Freer, supra note 88, at 1650.
147 Stein’s position is complicated by the fact that he rejects the meaningfulness of
the distinction between state law applying of its own force in federal court and state law
being incorporated into federal law. Stein, supra note 146, at 1945-46 & n.50. Thus, he
would be equally happy to describe cases in which the forum state’s rule is used as an
example of federal law incorporating state law standards. But the fact remains that he
considers state interests vertically directed to federal courts within the state’s borders to
be legitimate, and thus relevant for determining whether the forum state’s rule should
be incorporated into federal law. This is contrary to the principle of coordinancy. For
further discussion of Stein’s approach, see infra Part III.C.
148 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2013). When the Act was amended in 1948, “trials at common
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courts to use state law that already applies of its own force to federal
courts.
Marshall himself adopted this interpretation of the RDA in
Wayman.149 If it were read as referring to state laws that did not apply
of their own force in federal court, the RDA would amount to a
delegation to the states of lawmaking power over federal procedure.
And given Marshall’s worries about such delegation, the RDA, like the
Process Act, would have to be read as only statically incorporating
forum state law.150 But Marshall argued that the RDA directed federal
courts to use only applicable state law, that is, law that already applied
to federal court of its own force.151 For this reason, federal procedure
was beyond the RDA’s scope, since, as we have seen, he considered
federal authority over federal procedure to be exclusive.152 It is for this
reason that he concluded that the RDA was irrelevant to the Kentucky
statute at issue in Wayman.153 Since the Kentucky statute could not
apply to the procedure of federal courts, it was beyond the RDA’s
scope.154
Marshall’s interpretation of the RDA was not only shared by others at
the time,155 it was also adopted in Erie156 and remains the predominant
view today.157 Of course, states are now understood as sharing
law” was changed to “civil actions” to make it clear that the Act applied to actions at
equity. Compare Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 944 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652 (1958)) (discussing “rules of decision in civil actions” (emphasis added)), with
Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1958)) (discussing “rules of decision in trials at common law” (emphasis added)).
149 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 25 (1825) (“But, by the words of
the section, the laws of the State furnish a rule of decision for those cases only ‘where
they apply[]’ and the question arises do they apply to such a case?”). As Justice Marshall
put it in Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley’s Lessee, “The laws of the states . . . would be . . .
regarded [as rules of decision in the courts of the United States] independent of that
special enactment.” 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 492, 525-26 (1829).
150 See supra Part I.B.
151 Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 48-49.
152 See supra Part I.A.1.
153 Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 49-50.
154 See Bank of the U.S. v. Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51, 54 (1825) (noting that
the Rules of Decision Act “has no application to the practice of the [federal] Courts, or
in any manner calls upon them to pursue the various changes which may take place
from time to time in the State Courts, with respect to their processes, and modes of
proceeding under them”).
155 Hawkins v. Barney’s Lessee, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 457, 464 (1831) (noting that the
RDA is “no more than a declaration of what the law would have been without it”).
156 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72 (1938); see also Mason v. United States,
260 U.S. 545, 559 (1923).
157 Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 162 (1987)
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lawmaking authority over federal procedure with the federal
government.158 Thus, there is no longer any impediment to extending
the RDA to issues of federal procedure. If Oklahoma binds section
1101.1(B)(3) up into Oklahoma contract actions, we can understand a
federal court entertaining an Oklahoma contract action to be required
under the RDA to use section 1101.1(B)(3).159 But the RDA is still
generally read as referring only to state laws that would have applied in
federal court of their own force in the RDA’s absence.
The problem is that virtually all federal courts and legal scholars,
following John Hart Ely, accept a second thesis, which is that the twin
aims follow from the RDA.160 And anyone accepting these two theses
must reject the principle of coordinancy. The twin aims are solely about
uniformity with a forum state court.161 If this uniformity is due to the
fact that forum state law actually applies in federal court of its own

(Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the Rules of Decision Act “directs federal courts to
follow state laws only ‘in cases where they apply,’ which federal courts would be
required to do even in the absence of the Act”); Jutzi-Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d
753, 759-60 (7th Cir. 2001); Sergio J. Campos, Erie as a Law of Enforcement Defaults,
64 FLA. L. REV. 1573, 1590 (2012); Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARV.
L. REV. 1013, 1024-31 (1953). The Supreme Court is not always consistent on this
matter, however. For example, in her opinion in Agency Holding, Justice O’Connor, on
the one hand, pointed to the tradition of federal courts borrowing the forum state statute
of limitations for federal statutes and, on the other hand, characterized this use of forum
state law as required under the RDA. Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 147.
158 See supra Part I.A.2.
159 I assume here a reading of the RDA as instructing federal courts to use state law.
In fact, under the most historically sensitive reading, the RDA puts no duty upon a
federal court to favor state law over federal common law. As Walter Ritz has put this
reading, the RDA — by referring generally to “the laws of the several states” — is simply
a “direction to the national courts to apply American law, as distinguished from English
law.” WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789: EXPOSING
MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE 148 (Wythe Holt & L.H.
LaRue eds., 1990); see also Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the
Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79,
106-08 (1993); Suzanna Sherry, Overruling Erie: Nationwide Class Actions and National
Common Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2137-38 (2008). The RDA makes it clear, post
revolution, that American rather than English law should be used in federal courts. But
it says nothing about the division of common lawmaking power between federal and
state courts.
160 Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 38-39 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); In re Air Crash Disaster near Chi., 803 F.2d 304, 314 (7th Cir. 1986);
Olympic Sports Prods., Inc. v. Universal Athletic Sales Co., 760 F.2d 910, 914 (9th Cir.
1985); Feinstein v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 643 F.2d 880, 889 (1st Cir. 1981); Stoner v.
Presbyterian Univ. Hosp., 609 F.2d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 1979); John Hart Ely, The
Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 722-23 (1974).
161 See supra Part II.A.1.
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force, states must have vertical power over federal procedure. Whenever
the twin aims recommend that a federal court use forum state law,
forum state law must extend vertically to federal court.162
To be sure, not everyone accepts both theses. Some accept the second
but reject the first. They think that the twin aims are derived from the
RDA, but deny that the RDA only commands federal courts to use state
law that would apply of its own force in the RDA’s absence. For them,
the RDA can recommend that certain state rules be incorporated into
federal law.163 So understood, the twin aims could be derived from the
RDA without the principle being violated. The RDA would amount to a
delegation of vertical power over federal procedure to the states.164
B. The Principle and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
So far, I have concentrated on the principle of coordinancy being
rejected in relatively unguided Erie cases, in which federal courts
entertaining non-federal causes of action choose between a uniform
federal common law rule and the rule used by a forum state court. Let
us now move on to rejections of the principle when federal courts
162 Of course, sometimes the twin aims will tell a federal court to use sister state law.
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 494-97 (1941). For example, a
federal court in New York should use Pennsylvania law if that follows from New York
choice-of-law rules. In such a case it would appear that Pennsylvania rather than New
York law is what is applying in federal court of its own force. But New York is still
engaging in vertical regulation of the federal court’s procedure. The twin aims
recommended uniformity with New York’s choice-of-law rules. Given the two theses,
one must conclude that New York’s choice-of-law rules apply in federal court in New
York of their own force.
163 Dorf, supra note 76, at 125-26; Alfred Hill, State Procedural Law in Federal
Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 66, 76-90 (1955) [hereinafter State Procedural
Law]; Westen & Lehman, supra note 95, at 315-16, 356-59.
164 Although such a reading avoids conflict with the principle, the notion that the
twin aims have their source in the RDA suffers from many other problems. See, e.g.,
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Bad for Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think the Supreme
Court Is Doing a Halfway Decent Job in Its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence?, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 963, 985 n.85 (1998) (“The great generality of the Act’s ‘in cases where they apply’
phrasing . . . gives little if any guidance as to when they should apply, leaving just how
to make the ‘relatively unguided Erie choice’ up to judicial interpretation . . . .”); Peter
Westen, After “Life for Erie” — A Reply, 78 MICH. L. REV. 971, 982-89 (1980) (discussing
problems with view that source of limitation on judge-made procedural rules in
diversity cases is the RDA); Westen & Lehman, supra note 95, at 365-73 (same). As I
have argued elsewhere, it is more plausible to identify the source of the twin aims in the
policies animating the diversity statute. Green, supra note 54, at 1891-1904. I also
explain why the twin aims apply when federal courts get jurisdiction of non-federal
actions in non-diversity cases, such as supplemental jurisdiction or bankruptcy, in
terms of the purposes of the applicable jurisdictional statute. Id. at 1917-34.
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choose between the forum state’s rule and a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure. My first example is Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v.
Allstate Insurance Co.165
1.

Shady Grove

The issue in Shady Grove was whether section 901(b) of the New York
Civil Practice Law, which prohibits claims for statutory damages or
penalties from being brought as a class action, should be used by a
federal court in New York when considering the certification of a class
in which the plaintiffs’ actions for statutory damages are under New
York law.166 The alternative was using Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which includes no equivalent limitation.167
Because the case concerned a Federal Rule, the twin aims were
irrelevant. The fact that federal courts’ using Rule 23 and forum state
courts’ using section 901(b) would generate vertical forum shopping
did not give the federal court in Shady Grove a reason to use section
901(b).168 Instead, the issue was whether Rule 23 was invalid under the
Rules Enabling Act.169 In the Act, Congress delegated its power to
regulate the procedure of federal district courts to the Supreme Court,170
with the restriction specified in 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) that Federal Rules
“shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”171 The main
question in Shady Grove was the scope of the substantive right
limitation.172
Following Sibbach v. Wilson,173 Justice Scalia read section 2072(b) as
demanding only that a Federal Rule “really regulate[] procedure — the
judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for

165

559 U.S. 393 (2010).
Id. at 396-98.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 415; id. at 456 (Stevens, J., concurring).
169 Id. at 406-10 (majority opinion).
170 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2013).
171 Id. § 2072(b). Another restriction is that the Court was given the power to
promulgate only “general rules of practice and procedure” for the district courts. It is
probable that this language withholds some of the congressional regulatory power,
because Congress is presumably empowered to regulate procedure in the lower federal
courts through rules that are non-general (that is, specific to the particular case). For a
possible example of such a statute, see Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie
Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005).
172 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 406-10.
173 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
166
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disregard or infraction of them.”174 So understood, the substantive right
limitation did not significantly restrict the power that Congress
delegated to the Supreme Court.175 Scalia concluded that since Rule 23
satisfied the substantive right limitation, it applied whether or not
section 901(b) was intended by New York officials to apply in federal
court.176
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens disagreed with Scalia about
the restrictions imposed by section 2072(b). The substantive right
limitation was intended to protect certain state regulatory interests.
There are, he argued, “some state procedural rules that federal courts
must apply in diversity cases because they function as a part of the
State’s definition of substantive rights and remedies.”177 Although
Stevens’s language might mean that the state’s rule must be bound up
with its cause of action, such that it follows that action into sister state
courts,178 it is not clear that he believes this to be necessary. He cites the
forum state rules in Cohen and York as satisfying his test,179 and, as we
have seen, in those cases the rules were probably not bound up with the
state’s cause of action.180 Indeed, in Cohen the cause of action was not
even under forum state law.181 This leaves the scope of the substantive
rights limitation as Stevens understands it in doubt. Section 901(b)
might count as a substantive right even if it extended only to federal
courts in the state, in violation of the principle of coordinancy. In the
end, however, Stevens concluded that the substantive right limitation
in section 2072(b) was inapplicable in Shady Grove because there was

174

Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 406.
Under Hanna v. Plumer, Congress’s power over federal procedure extends to all
matters “which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and
procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either.” Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460, 472 (1965); see also Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 32 (1988). Any
rule rationally capable of classification as procedural can probably be understood to
really regulate procedure. Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking “Substantive Rights” (in the Rules
Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 97 (1998). But see Kevin M.
Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 987, 1004
(2011) [hereinafter The Repressible Myth].
176 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 406.
177 Id. at 416-17 (Stevens, J., concurring).
178 Justice Stevens argued that under § 2072(b) the federal court could ignore §
901(b) only if it was “so intertwined with a state right or remedy that it functions to
define the scope of the state-created right.” Id. at 423.
179 Id. at 420.
180 See supra Part II.A.2.
181 See supra Part II.A.2.
175
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no evidence that New York officials intended section 901(b) to apply
beyond New York state courts.182
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg agreed with Stevens that
the applicability of a Federal Rule must take into account significant state
regulatory interests.183 Furthermore, because she thought New York
officials intended section 901(b) to apply in federal court, she argued that
Rule 23 must be read to make it compatible with New York law.184
Ginsburg primarily argued that New York officials intended section
901(b) to be bound up with New York statutory damages actions. So
understood, her argument was in keeping with the principle of
coordinancy.185 But there was a problem with this reading of section
901(b)’s scope. There was evidence that New York officials wanted
section 901(b) to be used by New York courts when entertaining causes
of action under other sovereigns’ laws.186 If section 901(b) was applied
by a New York state court to a statutory damages action under sister
state or federal law, it cannot be bound up with New York statutory
damages actions.
Responding to the problem, Ginsburg (citing Cohen) suggested that
the fact that section 901(b) applies in New York state courts to foreign
causes of action does not mean that it cannot extend to federal courts
in New York:
Shady Grove’s argument that § 901(b) is procedural based on
its possible application to foreign claims is also out of sync with
our Erie decisions, many of them involving state statutes of
similarly unqualified scope. The New Jersey law at issue in
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., for example, required
plaintiffs to post a bond as security for costs in “any
[stockholder’s derivative] action.” Our characterization of a
state statute as substantive for Erie purposes has never hinged
on whether the law applied only to domestic causes of action.
To the contrary, we have ranked as substantive a variety of state
laws that the state courts apply to federal and out-of-state

182

Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 416, 436 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 439-45 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Unlike Stevens, however, Ginsburg did
not rest her argument on the substantive-right limitation in section 2072(a). For a
discussion, see Clermont, The Repressible Myth, supra note 175, at 1015-16.
184 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 443-55, 457 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
185 Id. at 452-58.
186 For a critical discussion of this aspect of her opinion, see Michael Steven Green,
Law’s Dark Matter, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 845, 869-70 (2013).
183
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claims, including statutes of limitations and burden-of-proof
prescriptions.187
Ginsburg also offered York as an example where New York law extended
to federal courts in New York, even though the law was applied in New
York state courts to actions under sister state law:
Moreover, statutes qualify as “substantive” for Erie purposes
even when they have “procedural” thrusts as well. Statutes of
limitations are, again, exemplary [citing York]. They supply
“substantive” law in diversity suits, even though, as Shady
Grove acknowledges, state courts often apply the forum’s
limitations period as a “procedural” bar to claims arising under
the law of another State.188
Here, Ginsburg appears to be rejecting the principle of coordinancy.
There are three interpretations of section 901(b) that would allow it to
apply of its own force to a federal court in New York entertaining New
York statutory damages actions, given that it applies in New York state
court to statutory damage actions under other sovereigns’ laws. The
first, which would be compatible with the principle, is that section
901(b) created two rules: one that applies in New York state courts to
all actions for statutory damages (including actions under the law of
other sovereigns) (Rule 1), and another that is bound up with New York
statutory damages actions, following them into other court systems
(Rule 2) (Figure 11).

187
188

Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 454 n.12 (citation omitted).
Id. at 455 (citation omitted).
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Figure 11
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Such a scenario is arguably compatible with Ginsburg’s citation to York,
because in York the plaintiff sued under New York law in federal court
in New York. But it is not compatible with her citation to Cohen, for in
Cohen the cause of action was not under the law of the forum.189 This
interpretation must therefore be excluded.
Under the second interpretation, which would also be compatible
with the principle, section 901(b) again created two rules. One rule
applies in New York state courts to all actions for statutory damages.
Another is tied to some other locus of New York regulatory interest in
statutory damages actions implicated in the Shady Grove case (other
than the fact that the actions are under New York law), such as the New
York domicile of a party. This second rule would extend to all court
systems in which the locus of regulatory interest is implicated (Figure
12). But there is no evidence of this tortured reading of the section
901(b) and neither Ginsburg nor anyone else involved in the case ever
mentioned it.

189

See supra Part II.A.2.
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Figure 12
New York

Sister State

Federal Court

Federal Court

N.Y. Statutory
Damages Action

Other Statutory
Damages Action

N.Y. Statutory
Damages Action

Other Statutory
Damages Action

Shady Grove

State Court
N.Y. Statutory
Damages Action

State Court

Other Statutory
Damages Action

N.Y. Statutory
Damages Action

Other Statutory
Damages Action

Scope of N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (MCKINNEY 2006)
Rule 1
Rule 2

The third and most plausible interpretation is that Ginsburg thought
that section 901(b) extends vertically to all statutory damages actions
in federal court in New York, in violation of the principle of
coordinancy (Figure 13).
Figure 13
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Although only Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito joined Ginsburg’s
opinion, it is not clear that a rejection of the principle is a minority
position on the Court, for no one questioned Ginsburg’s assumption
about New York’s power.
2.

Godin v. Schencks

Because five Justices (Stevens, Ginsburg, Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito)
concluded in Shady Grove that a Federal Rule can be inapplicable due
to a conflict with state regulatory interests, federal courts arguably must
assess the scope of competing state rules in order to determine the
validity of Federal Rules.190 As a result, the validity of the principle can
arise. An example is Godin v. Schencks, decided by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit nine months after Shady Grove.191
Godin concerned whether a federal court in Maine entertaining
defamation actions under Maine law should use Maine’s anti-SLAPP
statute, which provides defendants with procedural devices to prevent
meritless suits from chilling protected speech.192 In the end, the court
concluded that Maine’s statute did not conflict with any Federal Rules
(in particular Rules 12(b)(6) and 56).193 But it came to this conclusion
because it thought the statute was “so intertwined with a state right or
remedy that it functions to define the scope of the state-created right.”194
If a Federal Rule had been incompatible with the statute, “a serious
question might be raised under the Rules Enabling Act.”195 Having
characterized the case as a relatively unguided Erie choice, the court
appealed both to the twin aims and to Maine’s goal of protecting
defendants from meritless suits that chill free speech to conclude that
the state rule should be used.196
Despite characterizing Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute as intertwined with
state rights, the First Circuit never concluded that the statute was
intended by Maine authorities to follow Maine actions into sister state
courts. The statute speaks solely of its effect in Maine courts without

190 E.g., Garman v. Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 630 F.3d 977, 983-85 (10th Cir.
2010). Under this reading of Shady Grove, Justice Stevens’s interpretation of the
substantive-right limitation in section 2072(b) is controlling. For a different view, see
Clermont, The Repressible Myth, supra note 175, at 1015-16.
191 Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 80-81 (1st Cir. 2010).
192 Id. at 80-82.
193 Id. at 87-91.
194 Id. at 89.
195 Id. at 90.
196 Id. at 86.
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any limitation to Maine causes of action.197 Thus, in claiming that the
anti-SLAPP statute defined the state-created right, the Godin court
appeared to be rejecting the principle of coordinancy. The statute
applied in federal courts in Maine (including to actions under sister
state law), but not to federal or state courts in sister states.
C. The Principle in Federal Question Actions
Finally, let us turn to rejections of the principle of coordinancy in
federal question actions. An example is Justice Scalia’s concurrence in
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., which addressed
whether a federal court in Pennsylvania entertaining a civil RICO action
that lacked its own limitations period should use Pennsylvania’s statute
of limitations for fraud or a limitations period from an analogous federal
statute.198
In her majority opinion, Justice O’Connor noted as a threshold matter
that “[t]he characterization of a federal claim for purposes of selecting
the appropriate statute of limitations is generally a question of federal
law.”199 The question was not whether the forum state statute of
limitations applies of its own force to the RICO action, but whether state
law should be borrowed to serve federal purposes.
The theory that federal courts borrow rather than apply state statute
of limitations to federal statutes in federal court has been accepted for
more than a century. As Justice Frankfurter put it in Board of
Commissioners of Jackson County v. United States,200 “plainly whatever
rule [for a limitations period] we fashion is ultimately attributable to
the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States, and does not
owe its authority to the law-making agencies of [the state].”201
Having characterized the matter as solely about whether the forum
state period should be borrowed, O’Connor noted the “longstanding
practice” of federal courts engaging in such borrowing for federal
statutes that lacked limitations periods.202 In the light of the
197

ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 556 (2012).
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 157-70
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
199 Id. at 146 (majority opinion).
200 308 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1939).
201 Id. Justice Frankfurter came to the same conclusion in Holmberg v. Armbrecht,
where he argued that “it is federal policy to adopt the local law of limitation.” Holmberg
v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946).
202 Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 147. Section 1658 established a four-year federal
limitations period for federal statutory causes of action, but it does not apply to federal
statutes enacted before December 1, 1990. 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2006). Thus, the practice
198
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“congressional awareness of this practice, we can generally assume that
Congress intends by its silence that we borrow state law.”203
Nevertheless, it is permissible, she argued, for a federal court to use an
analogous limitations period from a federal statute, if federal interests
recommend it.204
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia challenged O’Connor’s view that
federal courts entertaining federal actions borrow the forum state’s
statute of limitations.205 In doing so, he rejected the principle of
coordinancy. Historically, he argued, federal courts “applied state
limitations periods to federal causes of action because [they] believed
that those state statutes applied of their own force, unless pre-empted
by federal law.”206 His primary example was McCluny v. Silliman.207
1.

McCluny v. Silliman

In McCluny, the plaintiff sought to purchase land in Ohio owned by
the United States, as was his right under a federal statute, but the federal
officer refused to accept his payment, causing him $50,000 in
damages.208 McCluny sued in federal court in Ohio for trespass on the
case, but the officer prevailed on the ground that the Ohio statute of
limitations barred his suit.209 The Supreme Court appeared to have no
difficulty with the notion that Ohio’s statute of limitations might apply
to a federal action in federal court. “It is a well settled principle,” Justice
McLean argued, “that a statute of limitation is the law of the forum, and
operates upon all who submit themselves to its jurisdiction.”210
McLean’s only concern was whether the Ohio legislature intended the
statute to apply to actions against federal officers for violation of rights
created by federal law.211 Although he admitted that the legislature

of borrowing still occurs concerning such statutes.
203 Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 147.
204 Id. at 146-56.
205 Id. at 157-59 (Scalia, J., concurring).
206 Id. at 158. Out of respect for this historical position, Scalia was unable to accept
the reasoning of the Court. Instead, he argued that the federal court was free to borrow
a limitations period from another federal statute, because the forum state’s statutes of
limitations did not provide an “appropriate” limitations period for the federal statute.
Id. at 170.
207 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 (1830).
208 Id. at 275-76.
209 Id. at 276.
210 Id. at 275.
211 Id. at 276-78.
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probably did not have such actions in mind, it was enough that the
language of the statute appeared to include them.212
Admittedly, McCluny’s immediate cause of action was probably
under Ohio law, even though Ohio law was violated due to the
deprivation of a right created by federal law. Thus, one might argue that
Ohio had regulatory power by virtue of its ability to define McCluny’s
cause of action. But the Court’s emphasis was clearly not on the cause
of action but upon jurisdiction.213 The presence of the parties before a
federal court in Ohio was, it seems, enough to give Ohio the power to
control what limitations period the federal court used.
It is true that in coming to its conclusion in McCluny, the Court relied
on the Rules of Decision Act.214 But, as we have seen, the Court did not
treat the RDA as incorporating state standards into federal law.215 The
RDA could not direct federal courts to use the forum state’s statute of
limitations unless the statute would have applied of its own force even
in the RDA’s absence.
It follows that McCluny (and Justice Scalia, insofar as he relies upon
it) implicitly rejects the principle of coordinancy. The forum state’s
statute of limitations extends beyond its own courts to, and only to,
federal courts within the state.
Federal courts at the time McCluny was decided considered the forum
state’s statute of limitations to apply vertically of its own force to federal
causes of action in federal court. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that
they also considered the forum state’s statute of limitations to apply
vertically of its own force to actions in federal court under state law,
including the law of a sister state.216 Furthermore, statutes of limitations
were not the only area where the forum state was thought to have this
power over federal courts within its borders. Federal courts also held
that the forum state’s evidence law applied to them of its own force.217
212

See id.
See id.
214 Id.
215 See supra Part II.A.3.
216 See, e.g., Bauserman v. Blunt, 147 U.S. 647, 652 (1893) (holding that Kansas
statute of limitations applies in diversity case in Kansas); Townsend v. Jemison, 50 U.S.
(9 How.) 407, 413-14 (1850) (applying Alabama statute of limitations to a Mississippi
contract action brought in federal court in Alabama); Le Roy v. Crowninshield, 15 F.
Cas. 362 (C.C.D. Mass. 1820) (applying Massachusetts statute of limitations to New
York contract action in federal court). See generally Hill, State Procedural Law, supra
note 163, at 78-81 (discussing role of state statutes of limitations in federal court during
the time of McCluny).
217 Initially it was unclear whether the relevant rule was that the forum state’s law
applied or the law under which the plaintiff sued applied. M’Niel v. Holbrook, 37 U.S.
213

122

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 48:73

Such cases are surprising, given the expressed view of the Court in
Wayman that federal power over the procedure of federal courts is
exclusive. To make sense of the special treatment given to statutes of
limitations and rules of evidence, one would have to argue that they
implicated some special regulatory interests of the forum state that
other procedural rules did not. But it is hard to see what these interests
could possibly be. In Wayman, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that
Kentucky has no power to regulate how federal courts executed federal
judgments in the state.218 The execution of a judgment involves
significant interference with property and liberty interests, with respect
to which the state has strong regulatory concerns. If such matters are
nevertheless beyond the state’s power, it is hard to see how the
limitations periods and rules of evidence used by a federal court in the
state should not also be.
Cases such as McCluny are important for a number of reasons. First
of all, they (and Justice Scalia’s endorsement of them) show the extent
to which the principle of coordinancy has been rejected even in federal
question actions. But McCluny also poses a challenge to my defense of
the principle. If federal courts traditionally thought of state statutes of
limitations as applying vertically to federal courts within the state, any
defense of the principle is suspect.
2.

McCluny Explained

However, I do not think that McCluny and allied cases should be
taken as evidence against the principle. One puzzle about McCluny is
how its conclusion that the forum state’s statute of limitations applies
of its own force in federal court is compatible with the existence of the
Process Acts, which directed federal courts to adopt the “forms of writs
and execution . . . and modes of process” of the forum state.219 If states
had an original power to determine the limitations periods and rules of
evidence used by federal courts within their borders, they should also
have had an original power to regulate other means by which rights are
litigated in federal courts. But that would mean that forum state law on
the matter should have applied in federal courts of its own force, even
(12 Pet.) 84, 89-90 (1838); Hinde v. Vattier’s Lessee, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 398, 401 (1831);
Hill, State Procedural Law, supra note 163, at 81-82. But eventually it became clear that
the forum state’s law applied. See Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Union Trust Co., 112 U.S.
250, 255 (1884); Potter v. Nat’l Bank, 102 U.S. 163, 165 (1880); Ryan v. Bindley, 68
U.S. (1 Wall.) 66, 68 (1863).
218 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 50 (1825).
219 E.g., Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93; see also Process Act of 1842,
ch. 109, 5 Stat. 499, 499; Process Act of 1828, ch. 51, § 1, 4 Stat. 278, 279-80.
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in the absence of the Process Acts. The Process Acts, like the Rules of
Decision Act, would be superfluous, except as a declaration of the
federal government’s disinclination to displace applicable state law.
But the Process Acts were clearly not thought to be superfluous.
Unlike the Rules of Decision Act, the Process Acts were understood to
incorporate forum state standards into federal law.220 Indeed, forum
state standards had to be understood as incorporated, since the
standards used by federal courts were not those currently in force in the
forum state, but those in place at the time of the enactment of the
relevant Process Act.221 Dynamic conformity to forum state law was put
in place only with the Conformity Act of 1872.222 Dynamic conformity
was resisted because it was thought to be an improper delegation of
lawmaking power to the states.223 But if state law applied of its own
force, a Process Act with dynamic conformity would not involve
delegation. It would simply be federal acquiescence in the use of state
law that already applied of its own force.
Given its incompatibility with the existence of the Process Acts (and
with Marshall’s position in Wayman that federal power over the
procedure of federal courts is exclusive), it is clear that something very
puzzling is going on in McCluny. Something must have pushed the
Court to adopt a position at odds with its other commitments. The
explanation is that it was attempting to overcome the problem of lack
of dynamic conformity in the Process Acts. Bound by static conformity,
federal courts found themselves compelled to use outdated versions of
forum state procedure. The solution was to understand a state
procedural rule as applying of its own force in federal court, since that
would allow the court to use the current version of the rule, rather than
the version in place at the time of the enactment of the relevant Process
Act.224 Concerning statutes of limitations and rules of evidence, the
Court took advantage of this possibility.
With the introduction of dynamic conformity in 1872, federal courts
no longer needed to engage in this fiction. And we immediately begin

220 Beers v. Haughton, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 329, 359 (1835) (stating, with respect to state
laws incorporated under the Process Acts, that “[t]he whole efficacy of such laws in the
courts of the United States, depends upon the enactments of congress” and that
“[b]eyond this, they have no controlling influence”); see also Barrett, supra note 19, at
838-39.
221 See Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 47-48.
222 Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197.
223 See supra Part I.B.
224 See Hill, State Procedural Law, supra note 163, at 77; Caleb Nelson, Persistence of
General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 550 n.229 (2006).
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to see the abandonment of the notion that the forum state’s statute of
limitations and rules of evidence apply of their own force in federal
court, in favor of the view that they are incorporated into federal law.225
Therefore, McCluny and similar cases decided before the introduction
of dynamic conformity should not be taken as evidence against the
principle of coordinancy. Federal courts’ considered position is the
modern approach, under which the forum state’s statute of limitations
and rules of evidence do not apply of their own force to federal causes
of action in federal court.
III. THE PRINCIPLE DEFENDED
As the many examples above show, the validity of the principle of
coordinancy is a significant question, for the principle has been rejected
by federal courts and scholars in a wide variety of circumstances. It is
now time to take on the question of whether the principle is indeed
justified.
A. Direct Discrimination Against Federal Courts
I would like to begin my defense of the principle by considering an
extreme case in which a state chooses to extend its law to all federal
courts, including federal courts in sister states, but not to sister state
courts. An example would be Oklahoma taking its attorney-fee

225 Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 616-18 (1895); Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713,
719-20 (1885); Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. United States, 17 F.2d 232, 235 (9th Cir.
1927); Stewart v. Morris, 89 F. 290, 291 (7th Cir. 1898). In Agency Holding Corp. v.
Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 160-61 (1987), Scalia points to Campbell as
an example of the view that the forum state’s statute of limitations applies of its own
force to federal actions in federal court. But Campbell actually suggests incorporation.
Tellingly, Justice Brown drew an analogy between the use of the forum state’s statute of
limitations for federal causes of action and the use of forum state procedure under the
Conformity Act. Campbell, 155 U.S. at 616-18. If the forum state’s statute of limitations
were considered inapplicable to a federal cause of action in federal court, he argued,
then the forum state’s methods of process and pleadings should also be inapplicable in
federal court despite the Conformity Act. Id. at 617-18. This suggests that he was not
arguing that the forum state genuinely has the power to regulate federal procedure
vertically, but was only suggesting that the language of the forum state’s procedural
rules should not be read so narrowly to defeat their effective incorporation into federal
law. Furthermore, he argued, if forum state statutes of limitation are not employed for
federal causes of action in federal court, the unacceptable conclusion would be that
these federal actions are subject to no time limitations at all. Id. at 616-17. This
argument proceeds not from premises about state power over federal procedure, but
from federal interests in repose for defendants from the threat of federal causes of action
and in avoiding actions in which evidence was so stale as to be unreliable.
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provision in section 1101.1(B)(3), which we can assume applies to all
contract actions (including contract actions not under Oklahoma law)
brought in Oklahoma state courts,226 and extending it to all contract
actions brought in any federal court (Figure 14).
Figure 14
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Here, I think it is easy to see why the state regulation of federal
procedure is illegitimate. It is true that Oklahoma can have a legitimate
interest in the attorney fees rules used by federal courts that entertain
Oklahoma contract actions, that have Oklahoma domiciliaries as
parties, or before whom Oklahoma attorneys appear. But such loci of
state interest cannot justify the extension of section 1101.1(B)(3) to all
and only federal courts. If they were the grounds for the extension of
section 1101.1(B)(3) beyond the Oklahoma state court system, section
1101.1(B)(3) would also apply to cases in sister state courts that involve
Oklahoma contract actions, have Oklahoma domiciliaries as parties, or
concern Oklahoma attorneys. And section 1101(B)(3) would not apply
to cases in federal courts that do not involve Oklahoma contract actions,
do not have Oklahoma domiciliaries as parties, and do not concern
Oklahoma attorneys. The only conceivable criterion that could explain
why Oklahoma has extended section 1101.1(B)(3) in this way is that it
is interested in regulating federal courts simply because they are federal
courts.
226

But see discussion supra note 113.
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Such a regulatory purpose is obviously illegitimate. To extend
Oklahoma law to a matter, the extension must be rationally related to
some legitimate Oklahoma interest,227 and Oklahoma cannot have a
legitimate interest in federal courts simply because they are federal
courts. That is, I think, as close as we can get to “one of those political
axioms, an attempt to demonstrate which, would be a waste of
argument not to be excused.”228
But let us assume that Oklahoma officials extend section
1101.1(B)(3) beyond their own court system on the basis of some
legitimate interest — say, the cause of action being under Oklahoma
law — but halt the extension at federal courts that entertain Oklahoma
actions, without including sister state courts entertaining such actions
(Figure 15).
Figure 15
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Given that there is a legitimate Oklahoma regulatory purpose in each
case to which Oklahoma law extends, would this be permissible?
I think the answer is again clearly no. Just as a state must have a
legitimate reason to regulate a matter, a state, having such a legitimate
reason, must also have a legitimate reason to limit its regulation.
227 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981) (stating that to satisfy the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
a forum state needs “a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating
state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair”).
228 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 49 (1825).
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Consider the following analogy. Except in unusual circumstances, a
state may not regulate on the basis of race. It may not impose some legal
burden only on African-Americans just because they are AfricanAmerican. But it is also true that a state, having a legitimate reason to
regulate, cannot limit the regulation on the basis of race. Having created
a speed limit of sixty-five to make people safer, it cannot limit that speed
limit to African-Americans.229
The same point is true concerning a state’s regulation of federal
courts. Even when it has a legitimate reason for regulating other court
systems, it may not discriminate against federal courts in the way that
it limits its regulation.230 One way of putting this point is that any
regulation a state imposes on the procedure of federal courts must be
based upon a criterion that is neutral with respect to the court system
to which the regulation applies. The regulation must be based on a
criterion that applies to similarly situated sister state courts.
B. Justifying the Principle
But, to my knowledge, no one has ever suggested that a state’s officials
extended their law to all federal courts. As we have seen, rejections of
the principle always involve the notion that a state’s officials have
extended their law vertically — to federal courts within the state’s
borders.231 Demonstrating that such vertical state regulation is
impermissible is more challenging because there is an apparently
neutral criterion that distinguishes regulated from non-regulated
courts, namely presence of the parties before a court within the state.

229 Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public
Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1980 (1997) (“It does not follow that just because
an interested state does not have to apply another state’s law, it may choose not to do
so for whatever reasons or in whatever manner it wants, no more than the fact that
Congress does not have to confer welfare benefits means that Congress may confer such
benefits on the basis of race or religion.”).
230 A similar antidiscrimination principle comes into play in Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S.
386, 387-89 (1947), which is commonly understood as holding that a state court may
not discriminate against federal law when determining jurisdiction. See H. Jefferson
Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 643 n.50 (1993);
Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation:
Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682, 692
n.62 (1976); see also Missouri ex rel. S. Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 5 (1950);
McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 233-34 (1934); Mondou v. N.Y., New
Haven & Hartford R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 55 (1912). Here I am arguing that a state may not
discriminate against federal courts when determining the scope of state law.
231 See supra Part II.
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Federal Question and Diversity Cases Must Be Treated the Same

My first argument in defense of the principle starts with the modern
consensus, discussed above,232 that a state’s statute of limitations cannot
apply of its own force to federal actions brought in federal court within
the state. According to this consensus, New York cannot extend its
statute of limitations to a federal action in a federal court in New York,
even in the absence of competing federal law. If that is true, I will argue,
it follows that New York cannot extend its statute of limitations
vertically to a federal court entertaining a state law action, including an
action under New York law. As far as vertical power is concerned,
federal question actions and diversity (or supplemental jurisdiction)
actions must be treated the same.
To see why, let us first consider the purposes standing behind statutes
of limitations. The two most commonly mentioned are: (1) that the
defendant has a right to repose when a reasonable amount of time has
passed for the plaintiff to sue;233 and (2) that the passage of time makes
evidence, particularly witnesses’ testimony, too unreliable.234 With
these purposes in mind, which sovereigns would have a legitimate
regulatory interest in their statute of limitations applying to an action?
One, of course, is the sovereign that created the action.235 Since it did
so with certain regulatory purposes in mind, it has an interest in
determining when vindicating those purposes should be sacrificed to
provide the defendants with repose. It also has an interest in
determining when the available evidence has become so stale that the
purposes standing behind its action cannot be effectively vindicated
through litigation.
Another sovereign that has an interest in extending its statute of
limitations to an action is the one whose court has jurisdiction. State
courts entertaining actions under sister state law often apply their own
statute of limitations for this reason.236 As the sovereign that is directly
threatening the defendant with liability, it has an interest in determining
when the goal of providing the defendant with repose should justify
232

See supra Part II.C.2.
Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989
DUKE L.J. 281, 290.
234 E.g., Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 34849 (1944); Addison v. California, 21 Cal. 3d 313, 316-17 (1978).
235 See Schrabauer v. Schneider Engraving Prod., Inc., 25 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1930) (“[T]he lawmaking body which has the power to create the right may affix
the conditions under which it is to be enforced.”).
236 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142 (1971); RESTATEMENT (FIRST)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 603 (1934).
233
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lifting this threat. Furthermore, since it bears the cost of adjudication,
it has an interest in determining when those costs are unjustified
because the available evidence is too stale to be reliable.
But these interests cannot justify a state extending its statute of
limitations to federal causes of action brought within federal court in
the state. Such an extension cannot be justified by pointing to the
interests of the sovereign that created the cause of action since the
action was created by the federal government.237 Nor can one appeal to
the interests of the sovereign whose court has taken jurisdiction of the
action, for it is a federal court, not a state court, that has jurisdiction.
It is true that one might be able to identify other sources of state
interest. For example, New York might have an interest in determining
the scope of the defendant’s right to repose if she was domiciled in New
York, even when New York is not the sovereign that created the cause
of action and is not the sovereign whose court has taken jurisdiction of
the case.238 To my knowledge, however, there is no evidence that any
state’s officials have read the scope of their statute of limitations in light
of such an interest. In any event, such a source of state interest could
not explain why New York’s statute of limitations applies of its own
force to federal actions brought in federal court in New York. The
extension of New York’s statute of limitations would still be coordinate
— the statute would extend to actions involving defendants who are
New York domiciliaries when brought in federal or state courts in sister
states and would not extend to federal actions in federal court in New
York when the defendant was domiciled outside New York.
In the end, there is only one possible contact with New York that can
explain why New York’s statute of limitations applies of its own force
to federal actions brought in federal court in New York. This is precisely
the one identified in McCluny — the presence of the parties before a

237 To the contrary, these interests justify a federal statute of limitations applying to
a federal action when brought in New York state court. E.g., Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v.
Burnette, 239 U.S. 199, 201 (1915) (holding that a federal statute of limitations applied
to a federal action brought in New York state court).
238 Given this possibility, it is not clear that we should read the consensus that state
statute of limitations cannot apply of their own force to federal causes of action in
federal court as denying the permissibility of such an extension to defendant
domiciliaries. It is conceivable that New York’s statute of limitations can apply of its
own force to a federal cause of action in New York, in the absence of competing federal
law, by virtue of a New Yorker being the defendant. It is perhaps for this reason that
Justice O’Connor argued that “[t]he characterization of a federal claim for purposes of
selecting the appropriate statute of limitations is generally a question of federal law.”
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 147 (1987)
(emphasis added).
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court within the state.239 As Justice Mclean put it, “a statute of
limitations is the law of the forum, and operates upon all who submit
themselves to its jurisdiction.”240
The modern consensus, in rejecting McCluny, must therefore reject
the notion that the presence of the parties before a federal court in New
York is sufficient to give New York a legitimate interest in extending its
statute of limitations to them when the plaintiff sues under federal law.
But if New York lacks vertical power when the plaintiff sues under
federal law, how could it possess vertical power when she sues under
state law?
Consider a federal court in New York entertaining an action under
Pennsylvania law. How could New York’s vertical power be any greater
in such a case than it was when the federal court entertained a federal
action? In both cases, New York is not responsible for the action and is
not asserting jurisdiction. And in both cases, any source of New York
regulatory authority independent of the presence of the parties before a
court in New York, such as the defendant being domiciled in New York,
can justify only coordinate, not vertical, power.
Matters are no different when one assumes that the plaintiff sues in
federal court in New York under New York law. New York is free to
assert regulatory authority over the procedure of such a federal court by
virtue of being the author of the cause of action.241 But that power is a
source of coordinate, not vertical, power. If New York is asserting
vertical power, its basis must be that the parties are present before a
court within New York. But that means that New York should have
vertical power when the plaintiff sues in federal court in New York
under federal or sister state law too.
Thus, as far as vertical power is concerned, federal question and
diversity (or supplemental jurisdiction) cases must be treated the same.
If New Jersey had vertical power in Cohen, then Ohio had vertical power
in McCluny. If Justice Ginsburg is right about New York’s power in
Shady Grove, then Scalia is right about Pennsylvania’s power in Agency
Holding.
But, one might argue, maybe we should conclude that Scalia is right
in Agency Holding. Perhaps the fact that the parties are before a federal
court in New York gives New York a legitimate interest in regulating

239

McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270, 275 (1830).
Id.
241 E.g., Schrabauer v. Schneider Engraving Prod., Inc., 25 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1930).
240
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the court’s procedure, even when the plaintiff sues under federal law.
Further arguments in favor of the principle are therefore needed.
In offering such arguments, however, it is best to concentrate on cases
in which all other reasons for New York to extend its law to a federal
court besides the parties’ presence before a court in the state are absent.
In cases in which the plaintiff sues under New York law or a party is
domiciled in New York, one is always in danger of concluding that New
York law applies on the basis of coordinate rather than vertical
lawmaking power. Our question, therefore, should be whether New
York can regulate the procedure of a federal court in New York
entertaining a federal action (or an action under sister state law)
between parties who are not domiciliaries of New York.
2.

States Lack a Legitimate Interest in Extending Their Law
Vertically

My second argument in defense of the principle is that the presence
of the parties before a federal court within New York is simply not
enough to give the state of New York a legitimate interest in regulating
the federal court’s procedure. To justify the applicability of a state’s law,
it is not sufficient to identify some connection to the state. The
connection must be rationally related to purposes standing behind the
law.242 And the bare presence of the parties in New York is insufficient.
Consider, once again, New York’s statute of limitations. When New
York extends its statute of limitations to a case, it seeks either to protect
the defendant’s repose or to impose its view about when the evidence is
so stale that the law at issue cannot be effective enforced. As we have
seen, New York’s creating the cause of action or a New York state court
actually taking jurisdiction can give New York a legitimate interest in
regulating such matters.243 It is also barely possible that the defendant
(or perhaps the plaintiff) being domiciled in New York gives New York
a legitimate interest in extending its statute of limitations to a case,
although that stretches the scope of New York’s regulatory power
beyond what has ever been asserted by a state. But none of these
connections can justify vertically extending New York’s statute of
limitations to federal courts within the state. For New York to extend
its statute of limitations vertically, it must be saying, in effect:

242

See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981).
See, e.g., Schrabauer, 25 S.W.2d at 532 (“[T]he lawmaking body which has the
power to create the right may affix the conditions under which it is to be enforced.”).
243

132

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 48:73

We wish to protect the repose and ensure the quality of
evidence presented against anyone who happens to be within
our borders, even when it is not our court that is threatening
the defendant with liability, we are not responsible for the cause
of action, and no party is domiciled within our state.
Such a thin connection between New York and the case is insufficient.
Granted, the presence of the parties before a court in New York gives
New York some regulatory authority over them. Were one party to
assault the other within the federal courthouse, New York law could
still apply to the matter of its own force, in the absence of competing
federal law.244 But when New York seeks to extend its statute of
limitations vertically, it is regulating the federal lawsuit itself, not
matters that are tangential to the suit. It seeks either to protect the
defendant’s repose from the threat imposed by the federal lawsuit or to
impose its judgment about when the evidence in that lawsuit is so stale
that the law cannot be effective enforced.245 And the presence of the
parties in New York cannot justify such regulation.
Indeed, if it could, why should the presence of the parties in New
York not give the state an interest in extending its statute of limitations
244 To say that New York law might apply of its own force to the assault is compatible
with the Enclave Clause, which states that Congress has the power “[t]o exercise
exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever . . . over all Places purchased by the
Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of
Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings . . . .” U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 17; see United States v. Vaughan, 682 F.2d 290, 295 (2d Cir. 1982)
(applying the Clause to federal courthouses). The Clause cannot reasonably be taken to
mean that federal legislative authority over what goes on in the enclave is exclusive.
Although the Court has held that the United States acquires “complete sovereignty”
over the enclave, it more reasonably treated states as still possessing concurrent
lawmaking power that becomes relevant when federal preemption is removed. S.R.A.,
Inc., v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558, 562-63 (1946); see Howard v. Comm’rs of Sinking
Fund, 344 U.S. 624, 626 (1953); Allan Erbsen, Constitutional Spaces, 95 MINN. L. REV.
1168, 1234-42 (2011). In the end, the Enclave Clause merely means that Congress has
the power to preempt otherwise applicable state law with federal law. So understood, it
appears constitutionally superfluous. See Erbsen, supra, at 1234-42.
Because actions concerning enclaves that rely on state law standards have been held
to have federal question jurisdiction, it would appear that all state law has in fact been
fully preempted by federal law, although many state law standards have been
incorporated. Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006);
see Assimilative Torts Act, 16 U.S.C. § 457 (2006); Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 13 (1996). But even if that is true, states still possess a concurrent defeasible
lawmaking authority over federal enclaves.
245 See Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49
(1944); Addison v. California, 21 Cal. 3d 313, 316-17 (1978); Carrington, supra note
233, at 290.
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to a lawsuit in a sister state court? Assume that a Minnesota domiciliary,
sued on a Connecticut cause of action in a Connecticut state court, stays
in a New York hotel during the course of the lawsuit. If the presence of
the defendant in New York gives the state an interest in extending its
statute of limitations to a federal court in New York, why not to the state
court in Connecticut?
What is more, if the presence of the parties within a state were a
legitimate reason for the state’s extending its statute of limitations to
them, one would expect it to have been mentioned as a reason why a
state court can apply its statute of limitations to the parties over whom
it has asserted jurisdiction, even when the plaintiff sues under sister
state law. But it has not. The justification for the state court applying its
statute of limitations is based instead on the fact that it has actually
taken jurisdiction, thereby incurring certain costs and obtaining certain
powers over the parties.246
3.

Vertical Power Discriminates Against Federal Courts

My third argument in favor of the principle is that if New York is
asserting vertical lawmaking power, it would not be adopting a neutral
criterion for extending its law beyond its own court system. The parties
do not just happen to be present within New York. They are there as a
result of Congress’s decisions to place a federal court within New York’s
borders and to give the court jurisdiction over the action. Had Congress
decided to place all federal district courts in the District of Columbia,
or had it decided that a federal court in New York was not the proper
venue for the plaintiff’s suit, the parties would not be litigating in New
York. For New York officials to take Congress’s decisions as grounds for
extending their law to the federal court’s procedure is to impermissibly
single out federal courts for regulation.247
It is true the vertical regulation might be facially neutral. New York
officials might claim their law extends to all those who happen to be
present before a court within New York, whether the court is federal or
sister state. But if facial neutrality were sufficient, New York would have
a license to single out federal courts for regulation since only federal
courts can be located within New York’s borders. Permitting such
regulation would be equivalent to allowing a state to discriminate
against African-Americans, provided that they were singled out on the
basis of a purportedly neutral criterion that only they possessed.
246 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142 (1971); RESTATEMENT (FIRST)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 603 (1934).
247

See supra Part III.A.
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Nor can New York claim power to extend its law on the basis of some
presence of the parties in the state that is unrelated to litigation in
federal court. It is true that, in most cases, the parties before a federal
court in New York would have had some presence in the state even if
the federal litigation had occurred elsewhere. But such contact with
New York cannot explain how New York has vertical power over federal
procedure.
Consider a Californian, tagged in New York while on a business trip,
who is now before a federal court in New York litigating a federal cause
of action that arose outside of New York. It is true that the defendant
would have been in New York on her business trip even if there were
no federal court in the state. But how can that connection justify New
York extending its statute of limitations to the defendant? If it could,
New York would be able to use the contact to extend its statute of
limitations to the California defendant in whatever federal or state court
she was sued. But the notion that the defendant’s business trip to New
York would allow New York’s statute of limitations to extend (even
defeasibly) to a suit against the defendant under federal law in federal
court in the District of Columbia, or under Pennsylvania law in state
court in Alaska, is absurd.248
In the end, the only contacts that can conceivably justify New York’s
asserting vertical lawmaking power are those generated by the federal
government’s own choices. It is only on the basis of the fact that the
federal government has chosen to threaten the defendant with liability
within the state of New York that New York would have any argument
that it can assert its views about her right to repose or the staleness of
the evidence against her. But that means extending New York law
beyond the New York state court system in a manner that uniquely
identifies federal courts.
For the same reason that Congress’s choice to place a federal court in
New York cannot justify the vertical extension of New York’s statute of
248 What is more, even if New York could claim power over federal procedure on the
basis of the defendant’s being tagged in the state, it would follow that New York would
have vertical power only in a subset of actions brought in federal court in New York.
Some federal statutes have provisions allowing for nationwide service of process. As a
result, federal courts are able to entertain such actions in circumstances where a state
court would have been unable to get jurisdiction over the parties. E.g., 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(e)(2) (2006) (providing nationwide service of process for ERISA). Likewise
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2), a federal court entertaining a federal
cause of action can get personal jurisdiction over a defendant who would not be subject
to the jurisdiction of a state court. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(B) (also
known as the “100-mile bulge”) also allows a federal court to assert personal
jurisdiction over certain parties not subject to jurisdiction in a forum state court.
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limitations to that court, it cannot justify the vertical extension of other
New York procedural rules. With respect to each rule, there may be
some connection with New York that could justify its coordinate
extension. For example, it is likely that the fact that communications
between an attorney and client occurred in New York is enough for New
York to extend its attorney-client privilege, at least defeasibly, to federal
courts, including those entertaining actions under federal law. But for
New York to assert vertical regulatory authority, such connections are
insufficient.
4.

Two Reductiones ad Absurdum

My final argument in defense of the principle consists of a pair of
reductiones ad absurdum. Assume that the fact that the parties are before
a federal court in New York gives the state the power to extend its
statute of limitations or other procedural law to them. What would
happen if Congress chose to place all federal district courts in New
York? Would it really follow that New York’s statute of limitations
applied of its own force to all actions in federal court, unless preempted
by federal law? Would New York, among all the states, have unique
regulatory authority over federal courts? The answer, I think, is clearly
no. But if Congress’s choice to place all federal courts in New York
cannot give the state vertical power, how can Congress’s choice to place
some federal courts in the state do so?
What is more, assume the presence of the parties before a federal
district court in New York gave the state the power to vertically extend
procedural law for New York trial courts to the federal district court.
Why should it not also follow that Congress’s choice to place a federal
court of appeals in New York gives the state the power to vertically
extend New York appellate procedure to the federal court of appeals?
New York law would apparently apply of its own force in the Second
Circuit, until displaced by federal law. And had Congress chosen to
place the United States Supreme Court within New York City, New
York’s rules of appellate procedure would apparently apply of their own
force to it too. That cannot be true.
C. Refining the Principle
The principle of coordinancy, I conclude, is justified. In particular, a
forum state law that is “procedural,” in the sense that it applies to all
actions of a certain type when brought before the state’s courts —
without limitation on the basis of some locus of state interest that would
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justify the law’s extension to sister state courts — cannot be extended
to federal courts in the state.
An example of such a “procedural” law is the New Jersey statute in
Cohen, which applied to “any action instituted or maintained in the
right of any domestic or foreign corporation by the holder or holders of
shares.”249 Satisfaction of that standard did not, on its own, generate a
New Jersey interest. The only reason New Jersey was legitimately
interested in the statute applying in a New Jersey state court was fact
that the court had actually taken jurisdiction over the parties. And that
is insufficient to give New Jersey power beyond its own court system.
Examples of state laws that, like the statute in Cohen, cannot be read
as extending to federal courts of their own force, are the New York
statute of limitations in York,250 the New Jersey affidavit of merit statute
in Chamberlain,251 and the New York restriction on class actions in
Shady Grove.252 In each case, the law applied in forum state courts to all
causes of action of a certain type, without being limited by any locus of
forum state regulatory interest that could justify the law’s extension to
sister state courts. State interests should be irrelevant when federal
courts decide whether the standards in such laws should be used.
To repeat, a state’s regulation of the procedure of federal courts must
satisfy the principle of coordinancy. That does not mean, however, that
a state’s extension of its law beyond its own court system on the basis
of criteria that satisfy the principle might not, as a matter of fact, result
in the law applying only to federal courts within the state. This could
occur if the interest that justifies the extension of the state’s law beyond
its own court system satisfies the principle, but the extension becomes
limited to federal courts in the state in a manner that likewise satisfies
the principle.
The simplest example is, curiously, the Kentucky statute at issue in
Wayman.253 Why would Kentucky officials wish this statute to apply
beyond the Kentucky state court system to federal courts within the
state? The reason is not bare fact that the federal court or the parties are
within the state’s borders. Rather, it is the fact that the execution of a
federal judgment against property in Kentucky is a matter of state
concern. Such an interest satisfies the principle because it would apply
to sister state courts, to the extent that they execute their judgments in
Kentucky. But because sister state courts have no constitutional power
249
250
251
252
253

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-15 to 17 (West 1945).
Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945).
Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2000).
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 416 (2010).
See MOREHEAD & BROWN, supra note 25, at 629-30.
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to execute their judgments outside their borders,254 the applicability of
the statute to them has no purchase. The matter is different with federal
courts, which have the constitutional power to execute their judgments
over any persons or property within the country.255 However, since the
only federal court that would in fact execute its judgments in Kentucky
is one located within the state,256 the Kentucky statute would generally
apply in practice only to federal courts within Kentucky without the
principle being violated. I think we must conclude, therefore, that the
principle is insufficient to justify Marshall’s decision in Wayman. It is
only because he (wrongly) understood the federal government to have
exclusive authority over federal procedure, including over the rules for
the execution of federal judgments, that he arrived at his decision.257
Another possible example of a state law extending only to federal
courts in the state in a manner that satisfies the principle is the
Mississippi statute at issue in Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.258 This
statute required “a foreign corporation doing business in [Mississippi]
to file a written power of attorney designating an agent on whom service
of process may be had,” and also provided that “‘[a]ny foreign
corporation failing to comply with the above provisions shall not be
permitted to bring or maintain any action or suit in any of the courts of
this state.’”259
The Supreme Court held that the Mississippi rule should be used in
federal court. It is relatively easy to justify this conclusion on the basis
of the twin aims: if federal courts in Mississippi did not require out-ofstate corporations to register before bringing suit, while state courts in
Mississippi did, there would unquestionably be forum shopping. Out254

See Pennington v. Fourth Nat’l Bank of Cincinnati, 243 U.S. 269, 272 (1917).
Miss. Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946) (“Congress could
provide for service of process anywhere in the United States.”); Toland v. Sprague, 37
U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838); see also Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554 (1980)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (“[D]ue process requires only certain minimum contacts
between the defendant and the sovereign that has created the court . . . . The cases before
us involve suits against residents of the United States in the courts of the United States.
No due process problem exists.”). Two areas where this power is taken advantage of are
bankruptcy and judgments in favor of the United States. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2010); 28
U.S.C. § 2413 (1948).
256 Ordinarily enforcement of a judgment by a federal court is in the state where the
federal court is located. See 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
3012 (2d ed. 1997). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1996), however, a judgment of one federal
court may be registered in a different district and enforced there.
257 See supra Part I.A.1.
258 337 U.S. 535, 536 (1949).
259 Id. at 536 n.1 (discussing and quoting requirements of section 5319 of the
Mississippi Code of 1942).
255
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of-state corporations would choose federal over state court to avoid the
registration requirement. Furthermore, there appear to be no significant
countervailing federal interests in favor of using a uniform federal
common law rule.
But can we also understand Mississippi as legitimately interested in
its law applying in federal courts in the state? Allan Stein argues that we
can: “The purpose of the state rule was to prevent out-of-state
corporations from not registering with the state. Federal disregard of
that limitation would undermine that policy to the extent that
corporations would risk not registering since they could always avail
themselves of a federal forum.”260 Here we can agree with Stein that
Mississippi has a legitimate interest in its law extending to federal court.
The Mississippi statute identifies a clear locus of Mississippi regulatory
interest, namely, the corporation’s doing business in the state.
Mississippi puts an obligation on such corporations to register in
Mississippi and penalizes them for failing to do so by prohibiting them
from bringing suits. Whether Mississippi in fact sought to extend the
prohibition on bringing suits to federal courts within Mississippi, it
could have done so without violating the principle. After all, Mississippi
could have kept such corporations from evading the requirement by
prohibiting them from bringing suits in sister state courts as well,
although sister state courts would of course have been under no
obligation to respect this limitation on the corporation’s power.
What is more, Mississippi would have a rational reason to limit the
extension of its statute to federal courts in Mississippi, on the ground
that an out-of-state corporation inclined to sue in Mississippi state
courts might find it most convenient to escape the registration
requirement by suing in federal courts in Mississippi rather than federal
or state courts in sister states. Mississippi would not be discriminating
against federal courts but simply choosing to limit the scope of its
statute to cases where it would have the greatest effect.
CONCLUSION
Given that the principle of coordinancy is justified, what are the
consequences? The most profound effect is on federal courts deciding
Erie cases. Assume that a federal court is attempting to determine
260 Stein, supra note 146, at 1999. On the other hand, if Mississippi’s goal had simply
been to not expend its judicial resources on foreign corporations who had not registered
to do business in the state, Stein admits it would have no interest in its law applying in
federal court. Id. at 1990-91. Indeed, by taking such cases, federal courts would be doing
Mississippi a favor.
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whether a procedural matter should be governed by a federal common
law rule that is uniform across federal courts or a rule from the forum
state. In the course of the relatively unguided Erie analysis, some of the
interests to which the court must look are federal. The twin aims — the
goal of procedural uniformity with forum state courts — are motivated
by federal interests.261 Likewise, the countervailing interests that
recommend using a rule that is uniform across federal courts are federal
in nature.
But there is a place in the relatively unguided Erie analysis for state
interests as well. It is here that the principle has important
consequences. Anyone claiming that the forum state has an interest in
its rule being used by a federal court must point to how the rule can
extend to sister state courts as well. If this requirement cannot be
satisfied, state interests are irrelevant.
Discussion by legal scholars of state interests in federal procedure
tends to elide the crucial distinction between whether the interest is
coordinate or vertical. Consider the following passage by Allan Stein:
[A state] may want to encourage trust relationships by
bestowing evidentiary privileges, to achieve repose by imposing
a statute of limitations, or to deter wrongful conduct by
conditioning court access on a foreign corporation’s registration
with the secretary of state. It is generally conceded that federal
courts should not unduly frustrate these external regulatory
objectives.262
Stein fails to distinguish between cases in which the state’s officials
extend their law coordinately or vertically. Do New York officials seek
to provide repose to defendants because of some connection with the
state, such as the cause of action being under New York law or a party
being a New York domiciliary, that would also extend the statute of
limitations to sister state courts? This is permissible. Or do they simply
seek to extend the statute of limitations to federal courts within New
York? This is beyond New York’s power.
The principle is respected by Byrd’s bound-up test, which looks to
whether the forum state’s rule is part of the cause of action upon which
the plaintiff sues. So understood, the rule would follow the state’s cause
of action into federal and state courts in sister states and would be
inapplicable to sister state actions in federal courts within the forum
state. The principle can also be satisfied by other accounts of the scope
261
262

See supra Part II.A.1.
Stein, supra note 146, at 1968.
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of state law, such as those that look to the domicile of a party. But if the
state’s rule is one that applies in state court to anyone over whom the
court has jurisdiction, the state has no legitimate interest in the rule’s
extension to federal courts. The relatively-unguided Erie analysis must
look to federal interests alone.
One relatively unguided Erie case that I believe would have come out
differently had the principle been recognized is Gasperini. In Gasperini,
the federal interests in favor of vertical uniformity and the federal
interests in favor of a uniform federal common law rule were in
equipoise, such that New York interests were decisive in the Court’s
conclusion that the federal district court should use the New York
rule.263 But because New York state courts had applied the New York
rule to actions under the law of other sovereigns,264 had the Court
recognized the principle it would have concluded that New York
interests were irrelevant. The argument for a uniform federal common
law rule would have prevailed.
The principle is also important to federal courts determining whether
state regulatory interests trigger the substantive rights limitation on the
validity of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. One cannot assume, as
Justice Ginsburg does in Shady Grove, that state officials are interested
in extending to federal court a rule that would not also extend to sister
state courts.
But the principle has broader consequences. Congress, or those
exercising delegated congressional power, regulate the procedure of
federal courts in the background of respect for state interests. Here too,
such interests are irrelevant unless the principle is satisfied. For
example, Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence directs federal
courts to use state privilege law for claims or defenses in which state
law provides the rule of decision.265 The rule was enacted with the goal
of protecting state regulatory interests in mind.266 To the extent that a
state extends its privilege law coordinately to sister states, it can be
understood as having legitimate interests to protect.267 But for those
states that treat privileges as fully procedural matters, state interests are
irrelevant and federal respect for them is misguided.
263

See supra text accompanying notes 115–22.
See supra text accompanying notes 143–45.
265 FED. R. EVID. 501.
266 See id.; H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 3, 9 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7083,
7077 (“The rationale underlying the proviso is that federal law should not supersede
that of the States in substantive areas such as privilege absent a compelling reason.”).
267 See Ford Motor Co. v. Leggat, 904 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Tex. 1995); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 (1969).
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